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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is comprised of three papers in the field of microeconomics. The first
examines bidder’s choice auctions using both field and laboratory experiments. The field
experiments demonstrate that traditional bidder’s choice auction theory does not always hold; the
laboratory experiments subsequently isolate several characteristics of this auction format to
explain why. We find that while price revelation does not impact the revenue superiority of the
auction mechanism, multi-good demand significantly reduces the revenue premium. Intuitively,
risk aversion plays less of a role when bidders have the opportunity to win multiple goods. The
second chapter is theoretical and presents a dynamic Markov labor market tournament in which
the manager does not have the ability to incentivize agents using money. Instead, the manager
can use task assignment to reward and punish agents who are in and out of favor with him. This
situation frequently characterizes public organizations such as schools and government agencies.
The prize of the tournament is the difference between groups in the present value of the agent’s
expected utility. We show that when the manager must delegate a certain number of tasks and
when agents’ cost of contractible effort is a convex function, the manager can incentivize
optimal non-contractible effort by agents. However, the total cost to the manager is higher than if
the manager was able to use monetary incentives. The third chapter is an experimental paper that
elicits consumer willingness to pay for food products labelled “natural”. The “natural” label is
not regulated in the United States; however, several manufacturers are currently under lawsuit
for selling “natural”-labelled food that contains genetically modified ingredients. This study uses
an incentive-compatible mechanism and a survey to connect consumers’ beliefs to the premium
that they associate with the “natural” label. Primarily, we find that consumers who believe
“natural” means “no genetically modified organisms” (42% of our sample) are willing to pay a
premium for “natural” food, whereas consumers who do not have this belief actually exhibit a
negative premium. The overall effect is near zero, although the identified heterogeneity suggests
that “natural” labels are potentially misleading.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is comprised of three papers in the field of microeconomics. The auction
mechanism examined in the first chapter has been used in a variety of settings including the sale
of real estate, antiques and customized phone numbers. The paper focuses on the design of the
mechanism: when it theoretically raises higher revenue than other mechanisms and under what
conditions the theory predicts behavior in reality. The second chapter also focuses on mechanism
design. A dynamic tournament is applied to a labor market setting that is commonly found in
public organizations. The theoretical results describe conditions under which a manager can
achieve optimal effort from his employees. Finally, the third chapter answers a pressing
empirical question regarding consumer willingness to pay for a “natural” label on food. Several
pending lawsuits partially motivate the paper. Although the three chapters are not directly related
and each represents a separate, stand-alone paper, the tools used throughout this dissertation are
similar. For instance, laboratory experiments are used in both the first and third chapters, and
microeconomic theory is used in both the first and second chapters. This introduction will
provide an overview of each chapter including its motivation, the methods used, and the primary
result(s).
Bidder’s choice (or “right-to-choose”) auctions are of particular interest to parties who
wish to sell multiple similar goods. Economic theory has shown that this type of auction, where
the high bidder wins the right to choose one good from among the available goods, results in
higher revenue under risk aversion than traditional good-by-good auctions. Most theoretical and
experimental work focuses on bidder’s choice auctions where bidders have value for only one of
the available goods. Chapter 1 presents a field experiment and a lab experiment that allow for
price revelation and multi-good demand, which are typically found in bidder’s choice auctions
used for the sale of condos, antiques, customized telephone numbers and other groups of similar
goods. We find that while price revelation does not have a significant effect on revenue, multigood demand mutes the theoretical revenue superiority the bidder’s choice mechanism. This is
consistent with the notion that the perceived risk of losing one’s most preferred good is softened
when there is a chance to win multiple goods. This result implies that bidder’s choice auctions
1

are preferred in settings where each bidder is likely to strongly prefer one good over the others,
though this need not be the same good for every bidder. Further, this work demonstrates the
complementarities of the field and laboratory settings to answer questions which are not clearly
resolved using only one setting.
In the second chapter, my coauthors and I develop a dynamic Markov model to capture
the incentives in indefinitely-repeated tournaments in labor market settings where agents
compete both to “move up” as well as to avoid a “move down”. Such settings naturally arise
regardless of whether explicit performance incentives or an organizational hierarchy exist. We
show that when monetary incentives are available, the dynamic tournament approaches the firstbest outcome, but we also allow for the possibility that the principal’s only available incentive
mechanism is the assignment of undesirable tasks to agents who are out-of-favor. Inability to
change salaries or demote workers is common for public organizations, such as government
agencies and schools. For instance, a school principal may not be able to monetarily reward or
sanction teachers based on performance, but typically has discretion within the labor contract to
vary class assignments and resources such as teacher’s aides. We model agents as being either in
or out of favor with the principal in any given period; those who are out of favor are assigned
more undesirable tasks. The prize of the tournament is the difference between groups (in favor
and out of favor) in the present value of the agent’s expected utility. We assume that agents’
effort cost of completing contractible tasks is such that these costs are minimized by assigning
equally burdensome tasks to all agents. Therefore the principal can motivate non-contractible
effort through differential task assignment, but this entails an efficiency cost. The model
demonstrates that employers may seek flexibility to vary task assignments in labor contracts not
only to adapt to changing circumstances, but also to enable them to motivate non-contractible
effort when agents’ compensation in fixed.
Food labeling has been widely studied, especially in the context of consumer willingness
to pay for features that are considered healthy, such as organic content. Additionally, labels are
highly regulated by the government; for instance, the phrase “low fat” cannot be used for foods
with more than 3 grams of fat per serving. Especially for labels indicating low environmental
impact, most of the theoretical literature acknowledges that there is some level of fraud in the
2

market for regulated labels, but the effects of an unregulated phrase on consumer demand are
unclear empirically. In Chapter 3, an incentive-compatible approach is used to elicit willingness
to pay (WTP) for grocery items with and without “natural” labels, several of which have
genetically modified ingredients. Several pending lawsuits regarding genetically modified
ingredients in food labeled as “natural” partially motivate our paper. Primarily, we find that
consumers who believe “natural” means “no genetically modified organisms” (42% of our
sample) are willing to pay a premium for “natural” food, whereas consumers who do not have
this belief actually exhibit a negative premium. The overall effect is near zero, although the
identified heterogeneity suggests that “natural” labels are potentially misleading and further that
there is potential for firms to exploit uninformed consumers.

3

CHAPTER 1
Multi-Good Demand in Bidder’s Choice Auctions

4

Abstract
Bidder’s choice (or “right-to-choose”) auctions are of particular interest to parties who wish to
sell multiple similar goods. Economic theory has shown that, under risk aversion, this type of
auction, where the high bidder wins the right to choose one good from among the available
goods, results in higher revenue than traditional good-by-good auctions. Most theoretical and
experimental work focuses on bidder’s choice auctions where bidders have value for only one of
the available goods. This paper presents a field experiment and a lab experiment that allow for
price revelation and multi-good demand, which are typically found in bidder’s choice auctions
used for the sale of condos, antiques, customized telephone numbers and other groups of similar
goods. We find that while revealing winning prices does not have a significant effect on revenue,
multi-good demand mutes the theoretical revenue superiority the bidder’s choice mechanism.
This is consistent with the notion that the perceived risk of losing one’s most preferred good is
softened when there is a chance to win multiple goods. This result implies that bidder’s choice
auctions are preferred in settings where each bidder is likely to strongly prefer one good over the
others, though this need not be the same good for every bidder. Further, this work demonstrates
the complementarities of the field and laboratory to answer questions which are not clearly
resolved using only one setting.

5

I.

Introduction

In a study of condominium sales, Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) reported results that
they argued “should surprise most economists”: they found that the prices of condominium units
in New Jersey varied significantly depending on the way they were sold. Units sold at auction
were valued more highly than those sold through bilateral negotiation. The specific auction
institution in use was a “bidder’s choice” (also known as a “right-to-choose”) auction in which
the winner, rather than receiving a specific condominium, earned the right to choose their
preferred unit from among those remaining1. Bidder’s choice auctions are also commonly used in
the sale of customized telephone numbers, antiques, bank branches following mergers, and other
sequential sales of multiple similar goods. Theorists and experimentalists have explored the issue
raised by Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) considering more generally the allocation of multiple
heterogeneous goods to a pool of bidders. The research has typically studied sequential or goodby-good auctions rather than bilateral bargaining in order to create a clean counterfactual to
understand the performance of the bidder’s choice institution (Burguet 2007; Goeree, Plott and
Wooders 2004; Eliaz, Offerman and Schotter 2008).
Importantly, Burguet (2007) demonstrates that in theory, the bidder’s choice auction
raises higher revenue than a simple sequential auction when bidders are risk averse. The
mechanism can “thicken markets” by creating competition across goods that are evaluated
independently of each other in the sequential setting2. Existing studies generally provide support
for Burguet’s theory, though the role of risk aversion is somewhat unclear (Goeree, Plott and
Wooders 2004; Eliaz, Offerman and Schotter 2008). Further, these studies only allow each

1

According to the National Association of Realtors, a “bidder’s choice” auction is: “a method of sale whereby the
successful high bidder wins the right to choose a property from a grouping of similar or like-kind properties. After
the high bidder’s selection, the property is deleted from the group, and the second round of bidding commences,
with the high bidder in round two choosing a property, which is then deleted from the group…” This process
continues until all goods have been sold.
2
Intuitively, the possibility that one’s preferred good will be chosen early makes the value of the later auctions less
certain. Risk-averse buyers therefore are willing to pay a premium to secure their favored good in an early round.
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bidder to have positive value for one good (single-good demand)3. Our study makes novel
contributions by studying the bidder’s choice auction in field settings, where Ashenfelter and
Genesove’s questions arose, while retaining the controls introduced by laboratory studies.
Specifically, we address several previously unexplored characteristics of this auction format,
including multiple values per bidder, as described below.
First, we compare bidder’s choice and sequential auctions with a variety of consumer
goods using a diverse pool of subjects in Reno, Nevada. The research design is that of a “framed
field experiment” that incorporates relevant elements of traditional field studies in economics,
including real goods and a diverse population of consumers, with appropriate experimental
controls (Harrison and List 2004). The field setting differs from the laboratory environment in
several ways, most critically in that an individual’s bids are based on “homegrown” values for
actual goods rather than induced values. We find that the bidder’s choice mechanism fails in this
environment, in contrast with theory and previous experimental work. Consequently, the second
part of our research uses a lab experiment to focus on two elements of bidder’s choice auctions
(multi-good demand and price revelation) that are not yet fully understood. We find that while
price revelation does not have any significant effect, multi-good demand significantly mutes of
revenue superiority of the bidder’s choice mechanism, which explains the results of the field
experiment relative to other studies.
Multi-good demand in the bidder’s choice setting has many applications. For instance,
winning condominium bidders frequently choose a condo that they plan to rent out and continue
bidding for the remaining condos, demonstrating that they have values for multiple units.
Harstad (2009) presents anecdotal evidence of winning bidders in art auctions choosing an
artwork and remaining to bid for further rights to choose. He also discovered that mergers or
acquisitions in the banking industry, where branches are sold via bidder’s choice auctions, result

3

For example, Eliaz et al. (2008) perform an experimental test of the theory where the high bidder drops out after
he has won in the first phase of the auction, and the remaining bidders place bids for the right to choose from
among the remaining goods. However, there are many instances in the field where it is the norm for winning
bidders to remain in the auction.
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in more branches sold than the number of purchasers. This indicates that some purchasers must
attempt to purchase several branches in different locations, implying multi-good demand4.
The U.S. Bureau of Land Management considered using bidder’s choice auctions to sell
wild horses in 2009, which originally inspired our field experiment. In this experiment, bidders
presumably had positive values for all three of the goods (an iPod package, a hiking equipment
package, and a wine package), bidders continued to bid in all phases of the auction, and most
bidders were risk averse. In addition, the winning price in each phase was revealed, similar to
sales in real estate or antiques via bidder’s choice auction. The results indicate that the theoretical
revenue superiority of the bidder’s choice mechanism under risk aversion may be overstated.
However, since personal values for the objects were private, it is impossible to know for sure
how the bidders updated their beliefs regarding values in each round. Further, it is possible that
the effects of risk aversion may not be as pronounced when bidders have a chance of obtaining
surplus from multiple goods than when they only have positive value for one good.
Therefore, the next stage of our research, the lab experiment, aims to bridge the gap
between theory and the field. We are able to isolate the effects of multi-good demand and price
revelation. Specifically, in one set of treatments, the participants are notified of the winning bid
after each phase, while in other treatments, they are only told who won and which object was
selected. Further, the level of competition is also varied: in one set of treatments, all participants
bid in every round regardless of whether they have already won, and in another set of treatments,
only two participants have a positive value for each good.
As previously stated, behavior in bidder’s choice auctions is of particular interest to
parties who need to sell several similar objects, and could also be applied in natural resource
settings where rights to land, greenhouse gas emissions, etc., need to be allocated efficiently.
Developing an understanding of how bidders behave under different conditions is important in
designing auctions settings, and this research aims to aid this development. We find that price
revelation does not have an effect on revenues, but the revenue premium is significantly higher
4

Additionally, it is easy to imagine that a firm may have positive value for more than one phone number or web
address. For instance, Comcast owns both 1-800-COMCAST and 1-800-XFINITY. Google owns various misspellings
of “google.com” to ensure users can reach their search engine, even if they are typing too quickly.
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under single-good demand than multi-good demand5. This is consistent with the notion that the
perceived risk of losing one’s most preferred good is muted when there is a chance to win
multiple goods. Further, this result implies that bidder’s choice auctions should be used in
settings where each bidder is likely to strongly prefer one of the goods over the others, though
this need not be the same good for every bidder.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a detailed review of the literature and
emphasizes the contribution of this research. Section III outlines the theoretical background.
Sections IV and V detail the field experiment and the laboratory experiment, respectively,
including design choices and results. Finally, a discussion is provided in Section VI. References
follow.

II.

Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Research
Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) inspired much of the work on pooled auctions and
bidder’s choice auctions when they observed declining prices in successive rounds of
condominium sales6. The authors hypothesized that bidders who were aware that waiting may
lead to a lower price were risk averse; the bidders did not want to shade their bids as theory
would predict because they were afraid of losing the condo. Shortly after, Gale and Hausch
5

The revenue premium is calculated as the revenue from a bidder’s choice auction minus the revenue from a
corresponding standard good-by-good auction.
6
While this paper focuses on bidder’s choice auctions, research on similar pooled auctions are worthy of
mentioning. Menezes and Monteiro (1998) show that a simultaneous pooled auction also yields the same revenue
as a standard sequential auction, though their model uses a first-price rather than a second-price standard auction
(in contrast to the related literature). Salmon and Iachini (2007) provide an experimental analysis of pooled
auctions and find that pooled auctions yield substantially higher revenues than ascending auctions. They find that
this increase in revenue is not due risk or loss aversion, and they instead provide an attentional bias hypothesis
where bidders overweight the surplus from winning their most preferred good as opposed to a lesser preferred
good. These pooled auctions, while similar to bidder’s choice auctions, are different in that bidders are not aware
of the “remaining” goods when they place their bids; the second-highest bidder wins the second right-to-choose,
but he is not aware of this outcome when he places his bid.
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(1994) compared the theoretical revenue of a bidder’s choice auction to that of a standard
sequential auction and found that the former is larger. However, their model is limited to a twobidder, two-good case.
Burguet (2005 and 2007) formalized the theory of behavior for the bidder’s choice
auction most frequently used today as a basis for lab and field experiments. He uses a simple
illustration with two bidders and then extends the model to include any number of additional
bidders7. The results clearly show that the bidder’s choice auction should raise more revenue
than the standard sequential good-by-good auction when bidders are risk averse. Burguet also
shows that bidder’s choice auctions are efficient and concealing information as to which goods
have been selected allows the seller to achieve higher revenue.
Interestingly, Burguet touches briefly on the topic of taste diversity (less than perfect
substitutability among the goods). This is analogous to what is later referred to as non-persistent
competition (single-good demand) in the literature; the extreme case is having positive value for
only one good and zero values for the other goods. He shows that greater taste diversity may
increase seller revenues even if it reduces buyers’ willingness to pay for some objects. While this
is not one of Burguet’s main conclusions, our research confirms this result. To our knowledge,
this dimension of taste diversity has not previously been tested in a lab or field setting and this
constitutes one of the main contributions of our paper. The variance of values over goods for
each bidder has been overlooked in much of the literature, yet this dimension is an important gap
between the theory and the field, as described in the introduction.
Harstad (2010) points out that persistent competition (multi-good demand) is the norm in
many instances of bidder’s choice auctions. He builds a theoretical model where bidders have
positive values for multiple goods and demonstrates that, under risk neutrality, the distribution of
equilibrium revenue from a standard good-by-good auction is a mean-preserving spread of the
distribution of revenue from a bidder’s choice auction. His discussion comments on the risk
averse seller’s preference for a bidder’s choice auction, but does not comment on the risk
preferences of the bidders in the base model. Harstad extends the model to include cases where
7

See Section III for more detail.
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bidders may believe that one good is valued over the other goods by the majority; he refers to
this good as “the usual favorite”. This modification may lead a winning bidder to choose a good
other than his most preferred in order to reduce competition in future rounds. While we do not
model this specifically (values in our design are drawn randomly), a few of our bidders do
choose goods that are not their most preferred. This may indicate some gravitation toward a
“usual favorite” belief, or may simply be a mistake by these bidders.

2.2 Experimental Research in the Laboratory
Experimental work on bidder’s choice auctions is a little sparse, though several recent
papers have reported successful results. Goeree et al. (2004) find that bidder’s choice auctions
raise more revenue than standard sequential ascending auctions under risk aversion. The authors
are able to compare observed bids with theoretically predicted bids to estimate a common risk
aversion parameter: on average, their bidders have the utility function: ( )

. Goeree et

al. recognize the value of testing multi-good demand, though they phrase the idea in a slightly
different way in their concluding remarks: “One extension is to consider bidders who value more
than one item. It is an open question whether the revenue superiority of the ascending bidder’s
choice auction extends to richer valuation structures where the simultaneous ascending auction
has proven to perform well.” This paper aims to fill this gap in the existing literature.
Our experimental design closely follows that of Eliaz et al. (2008), who demonstrate that
bidder’s choice auctions raise higher revenue that the theoretically optimal auction and show
how withholding some information or restricting quantity can benefit sellers. However, they
argue that risk aversion may not be the only factor contributing to aggressive bidding in bidder’s
choice auctions. They incorporate a “no information” treatment where bidders do not know
which good has been selected as they bid in each phase (similar to a pooled auction)8. In this
treatment, risk averse bidders are expected to bid below the risk-neutral bid (instead of above the
risk-neutral bid as predicted in a regular bidder’s choice treatment) due to the fact that they
8

This “no information” treatment is not to be confused with the “no information” treatment in our experiment;
Eliaz et al. refer to no information on goods selected, whereas we refer to no information on prices.
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essentially face a lottery over which good they will win. The authors find that bidders in the “no
information” treatment nonetheless raise their bids, implying that a different behavioral
phenomenon may be at work. By calculating the equilibrium bids for many different hypothetical
numbers of participants, the authors are able to show that bidders behave as if they are
competing with many subjects. The intuition is that bidders perceive the competition to be bigger
than it actually is; they distort the probability their good will be taken in each phase and do not
realize that they only need to compete with the one other person who values their same good.
This interesting result may also explain our results in part; however, we would expect this
behavior to be extremely muted, if not non-existent, in our experiment. In our multi-good
demand treatments, bidders are, in fact, in competition with every other bidder in their group (all
bidders have values for every good). Therefore, for this bias to hold, bidders would have to
believe that they are in competition with people who do not exist, which seems unlikely. Further,
if this bias was solely responsible for the revenue superiority of the bidder’s choice mechanism,
we would not expect a significant difference between the bidder’s choice auctions and the
benchmark auctions for multi-good demand. However, we do find that the revenue premium is
significant, even though it is diminished greatly from the single-good demand case. This paper,
however, abstracts from analyzing this in detail and rather focuses on establishing the differences
in revenue between single and multi-good demand9. The other main finding of Eliaz et al. – that
quantity restriction may increase seller surplus by allowing the seller to keep one good without
losing revenue – presumably would hold for our multi-good treatments as well, though we do not
test this explicitly.

9

All of the treatments conducted by Eliaz et al. assume bidders only have positive value for one good. Bidders drop
out of the auction if they have already won or if their good has already been selected.
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2.3 Experimental Research in the Field
To our knowledge, there exists only one prior field study on bidder’s choice auctions10.
Alevy et al. (2010) find support for the Burguet’s original theory by using water volumes that
differed by reservoir source and time of availability as goods. Farmers in Chile bid for the water
volumes in two treatments: a standard sequential auction and a bidder’s choice auction.
Arguably, the farmers had strong preferences for specific goods (volumes of water at a specific
time and place) – the authors state, “bids decline substantially for the less preferred goods in both
auction institutions, reinforcing the finding of heterogeneity in preferences” – suggesting that the
model more closely resembles a single-good demand situation than multi-good demand.
In this study, on the other hand, the three goods auctioned in the field experiment (an
iPod, hiking equipment, and fine wine) presumably have some substantial value to every bidder.
In fact, the three goods had almost exactly the same retail value so it is reasonable to assume that
the bidders had similar values for the three goods (or that at least that the variance of values was
less than the variance of values in the Alevy 2010 field work). Our field experiment thus
resembles a situation where competition persists more so than previous work. This, coupled by
the fact that we do not find support for the original theory in the field (despite clearly risk averse
participants)11, suggests that the revenue superiority of bidder’s choice auctions does not hold (or
is muted) by multi-good demand. Our subsequent lab experiment, therefore, seeks to further
develop and provide evidence toward this hypothesis.

10

By field study, we are referring to experiments that did not occur in an experimental laboratory. In the field
study discussed here, participants’ values for the goods were private and homegrown (i.e. the values were not
induced) and participants bid and paid with their own money.
11
In our field experiment, bidder’s choice auctions and standard good-by-good auctions yield approximately the
same revenue.
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III.

Theoretical Background

3.1 Single-good Demand
Burguet (2007) illustrates the intuition of the revenue superiority of the bidder’s choice
auction with this simple example. Two bidders each have unit demand for one of two goods.
Each bidder is equally likely to prefer either good – the bidders prefer the same good with
probability one half and prefer different goods with probability one half. The payoff to each
bidder for winning their preferred good is one (1) minus the price and the payoff for winning the
non-preferred good is zero (0) minus the price. The price paid is equal to the second-highest bid.
The goods are auctioned off in two phases where both bidders place bids for the right to choose
their preferred good in phase one. The bidder who wins in the first phase of the auction does not
participate in phase two. In the second phase, the remaining bidder has a fifty percent chance of
“winning” her preferred good and a fifty percent chance that the remaining good is her nonpreferred good. Expected utility in the second phase is given by the right-hand side of the
following equation.
(

)

( )

( )

In the first phase, bidders will not be willing to pay more than
indifferent between the two phases. Normalizing ( )
see that

⁄ for a risk neutral bidder and

utility function. This bid of

and ( )

, which will make them
allows one to easily

⁄ for a risk averse bidder with a concave

⁄ represents the seller’s revenue for a bidder’s choice auction

with risk averse bidders. A standard second-price good-by-good sequential auction, on the other
hand, would yield revenue equal to one half regardless of the bidders’ risk preferences; if both
bidders prefer the same good, the seller gets one (1), and if the bidders prefer different goods, the
seller gets zero (0). Therefore, under risk aversion, the bidder’s choice auction raises more
revenue than the standard good-by-good auction. Intuitively, a bidder in a bidder’s choice
auction faces a tradeoff between paying more and greater risk that her preferred good is not still
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available in the second phase. A risk averse bidder is willing to bid higher in the first phase to
avoid the risk of losing her preferred good.
Eliaz et al. (2008) extend this theory to account for infinite bidders and infinite goods. As
previously stated, they also add a dimension of quantity restriction. However, the bid function
that these authors derive applies only when each bidder values exactly one good (single-good
demand)12. Since our experiments involve both single-good and multiple-good demand, we
continue with Burguet’s example by modifying it to account for bidders with values for multiple
goods.

3.2 Multi-good Demand
Now we turn to cases involving multi-good demand, where bidders do not drop out
because they have positive values for multiple goods. Now, both bidders have positive value for
both goods: one (1) for the preferred good and

for the less-preferred good where

.

Again, there is a fifty percent chance that the two bidders prefer the same good and a fifty
percent chance that they prefer different goods. Expected utility in the second phase is now
represented by the right-hand side of the following equation.
(

)

(

)

( )

To elucidate, let us refer to the winning bidder in the first phase as “Bidder A” and the
other bidder as “Bidder B”. If the bidders prefer different goods, Bidder A chooses her preferred
good in the first phase and bids up to

in the second phase. Bidder B bids up to 1 in the second

phase since her preferred good is still available, but pays a price of
the bidders prefer the same good, both bidders have values of

(the second-highest bid). If

for the remaining good in the

second phase. Since the second phase is essentially a second-price good-by-good auction for the
12

The theoretical bid function derived by Eliaz et al. (2008) also assumes risk-neutrality of the bidders. Therefore,
the bids that we observe are higher than what would be predicted by their theory. In their experiment, the authors
use a benchmark treatment (a second-price sealed-bid good-by-good auction), where risk preferences have no
effect, as a comparison for the bidder’s choice mechanism. We follow suit and use this same benchmark in our
experiments as well.
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remaining good, both bidders will bid up to their value. Consequently, Bidder B receives a
payoff of zero: either she doesn’t win or she wins and pays the second-highest bid ( )13.
In the first phase, a bidder will bid

which makes her indifferent between winning in the

first phase and facing the lottery in the second phase. This is represented in the left-hand side of
the above equation. As in Burguet’s example,

will be larger under risk aversion than risk

neutrality; the bidder will be willing to give up some surplus in order to secure her preferred
from Burguet’s

good in the first phase and avoid the lottery. In comparing

in this example to

original model of single-good demand, it is clear that

; a bidder will bid higher in the first

phase under multi-good demand in this model. However, this is simply the result of increasing
demand for the goods (the good that had zero value to each bidder in the single-good demand
case has positive value in the multi-good demand case)14.
The more interesting result answers the question, “which case (single versus multi-good
demand) raises more revenue above the benchmark?”15 First, we will show that the bidder’s
choice mechanism raises the same revenue (in expectation) as the benchmark good-by-good
auction under risk neutrality for multi-good demand16. (Recall that under non-persistent
competition, Burguet showed that risk neutrality yields expected revenue equal to ⁄ in both
the bidder’s choice auction and the benchmark.) Under multi-good demand, risk neutrality leads
to an expected revenue equal to

in both auction formats.

In the benchmark, the seller’s revenue is equal to
good and

if the two bidders prefer the same

if the two bidders prefer different goods. Therefore, expected revenue is:
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Assume, here, that there exists a tie-breaking rule given that the bidders are completely identical.
Note that both of these simple models use one (1) as the value of the preferred good. Since this value is constant
and the value for the non-preferred good has increased, demand has increased. We choose to model the values in
this way for simplicity of comparison. Similarly, the values for both single and multi-good demand treatments are
drawn from the same support in our experiment. This reflects the choice that a seller may face when choosing an
auction mechanism: given fixed bidder values, is it better to use the bidder’s choice auction when competition
persists or does not persist? Or, similarly, should I use a bidder’s choice auction or a standard good-by-good
auction when I believe that bidders have low variance in their values? What about when they have high variance?
15
This is what we refer to as the revenue premium of the right-to-choose mechanism: the right-to-choose revenue
minus the good-by-good revenue. We are essentially asking which of the following is greater: (the risk averse R –
the risk neutral R), or (the risk averse X – the risk neutral X)?
16
Recall that this result was shown more formally by Harstad (2010).
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(

)

(

)

(

)

In the bidder’s choice format, the seller’s revenue is equal to the price paid in the first phase plus
the price paid in the second phase:
normalize ( )

. Since we are considering a risk-neutral bidder, we can

so that the bidder’s first phase bid function becomes the following equation.
(

Solving this for

yields

(

)

(

)

)
Adding

( )
for the price paid in the second phase

provides the expected seller’s revenue for the bidder’s choice format.
(

)

Now we show that the revenue premium of the bidder’s choice format is higher under
multi-good demand than single-good demand simply by comparing the variance of the secondphase lotteries. Risk aversion should cause a bidder to be willing to give up some surplus in the
first phase to avoid facing a lottery in the second phase. Given a particular level of risk aversion,
should a bidder raise her first-phase bid (over the risk neutral bid) more under single or multigood demand? It is simple to show that the variance of the second-phase lottery (the right-hand
side of the bid function) under single-good demand is ⁄ and the variance of the second-phase
lottery under multi-good demand is ( ⁄ )

( ⁄ )

( ⁄ )

Since

, the former

variance must be larger than the latter17. Intuitively, a bidder is more afraid of losing her most
preferred good in the first phase when she does not have a chance at positive surplus in later
rounds.

PROPOSITION 1: The risk averse bidder should raise her first-phase bid higher (over the
corresponding risk-neutral bid) under single-good demand than multi-good demand because the
variance of the alternative lottery in the second phase is greater.
17

For a formal proof, please see Appendix A.
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We predict, therefore, that the revenue premium will be higher in single-good demand
treatments than multi-good demand treatments. This result would be consistent with Burguet’s
aforementioned theory of increased seller revenue with increased taste diversity. Further, we
predict that bidding behavior will reflect risk preferences; a more risk averse bidder will bid
higher, given their value. Finally, we predict that a greater variance in values for a bidder in a
multi-good demand treatment will lead to that bidder submitting a higher bid, given that the
bidder is risk averse.
We realize, however, that risk aversion may not be the only force driving possible results.
Recall one of the secondary results of Eliaz et al. (2008) mentioned earlier. The authors calculate
equilibrium bids for different numbers of hypothetical competitors given the random value draws
in their experiment. They find that bidders behave as if they are competing with five other
bidders, when in reality, they are only competing with the one other bidder who values the same
good. This bias could conceivably affect behavior in multi-good demand auctions as well.
However, bidders would have to perceive that the competition encompasses more participants
than were actually participating (for the bias to work in the same direction). Under multi-good
demand, bidders do compete with all five other participants in their group; in order for this bias
to cause raised bids, bidders would have to believe they were competing with more than five
other people, even though there are only six people in each group.
It could be the case that the bias exists under single-good demand, but does not exist
under multi-good demand – i.e. the bias is the reason for the revenue superiority of the bidder’s
choice format when bidders only value one good, but multi-good demand eliminates this bias
because bidders do compete with everyone in their group. If this is the case, we would expect
that revenue under multi-good demand would be the same for both the bidder’s choice auction
and the benchmark. Our aim is to provide explanations for varying field results and this
behavioral bias could very well be at work in the field.
Another seemingly feasible behavioral bias could result from bidders only using their
highest value (value for their most preferred good) to determine their bid in multi-good demand
treatments as long as their most preferred good is still available. Previous literature has shown
18

that experimental subjects in pooled auctions may weight their most preferred outcome more
heavily than less-preferred outcomes due to an attentional bias (Salmon and Iachini 2007)18. If
this is the case, we would predict that single and multi-good demand treatments would yield the
same or very similar revenue premiums19.

3.3 Information
The results of two field experiments, ours and Alevy et al. (2010), vary in their support of
theory: our field experiment does not support the revenue superiority of the bidder’s choice
mechanism while the 2010 field work does. We can identify two major differences between
these field experiments and previous laboratory experiments: information revelation and single
versus multi-good demand20. In order to attempt to explain the contradictory results, we must
vary each of these attributes individually and simultaneously, which results in a 2x2x2 design.
Our lab experimental design is explained further in the following section.
Price information may allow bidders to update their beliefs regarding the bounds of the
value distribution. The distribution is always uniform over the support [1, 100], but public prices
will allow some expectation of the realization of these values. This, in turn, may alter a bidder’s
expectation of the probability of winning in subsequent phases based on the updated order
statistic. We predict that treatments where prices are revealed after each phase may exhibit
different results in the second and third phases than treatments where information is withheld
(the first phase should be unaffected since prices are not revealed until after the first phase is
complete).
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See literature review.
If the attentional bias was complete (i.e. the bidders only used their most preferred good in determining their
bid), then we would expect the revenue premium to be exactly the same for single and multi-good demand (given
identical values for the most preferred good). If the attentional bias only caused bidders to underweight outcomes
associated with their less preferred goods by some proportion, we would expect the revenue premium to be larger
than in the absence of the bias. This is due to the fact that the existence of less-preferred outcomes in our design
actually decreases the revenue premium (bids are not raised as high above the risk-neutral bid).
20
Recall that the variance in bidders’ values (which can also be thought of as the persistence of competition, the
level of taste diversity, or the level of heterogeneity in preferences) presumably differed between the two field
experiments.
19

19

As a preview, our field results indicate that in some cases, bidders who placed the
second-highest bid in the first phase actually decreased their bid in the second phase. These
bidders probably thought that they would win in the second phase after finding out that their bid
set the price in the first phase. They decreased their bid in attempt to gain extra surplus, but did
not take into account that it is theoretically optimal for every bidder to raise their bid in each
subsequent phase (given that their most preferred good is still available) until submitting a bid
equal to their value in the final phase21. We predict that this behavior of decreased bids in the
second phase may occur in our lab experiment as well. To test this, we execute additional
experimental sessions so that each of our other four treatments (bidder’s choice and standard
good-by-good, for each single and multi-good demand) are executed both with and without
information revelation.

IV. Field Experiment

4.1 Experimental Design
To study the bidder’s choice institution in the field, we conducted 30 auction markets in
the spring and fall of 2008. Subjects were randomly assigned to 16 markets in which the bidder’s
choice (hereafter “BC”) institution was implemented and 14 markets in which the standard
sequential good-by-good auction (hereafter “GBG”) institution was implemented, using a
between-subjects design. A total of 155 subjects participated in the study. With the exception of
three BC and two GBG markets which had six bidders, the markets contained five bidders each.
Subjects were recruited broadly from the Reno population with outreach to the
community taking place through flyers and announcements in local stores and through
community organizations. Subjects were also recruited from existing databases of non-students
who had participated in previous field experiments, and from University of Nevada Reno staff.
21

This optimal path of shading bids less and less in each phase is supported by the bid function derived by Eliaz et
al. (2008).
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Sessions were held on both the north and south side of Reno in accessible locations as well as on
the University of Nevada Reno campus. Statistical tests indicate that participants do not
significantly differ across the BC and GBG treatments in demographic characteristics that
include gender, age, education, and income, or in personality traits.
To cleanly observe the impact of the auction institution, the goods for sale in the BC and
GBG auction settings were identical. The goods, or more appropriately bundles, consisted of (i)
hiking equipment that included a backpack, water filtration device, and first aid kit, (ii) an Apple
iPod and speaker system, and (iii) three bottles of high quality wines. Each bundle had a retail
value of approximately $250. Within each market the goods were sold in three auction phases. In
each phase, a single good was allocated to the highest bidder using a second-price rule. In the BC
institution, the good sold was the right to choose from the remaining bundles, which varied with
the auction phase and market history. In the GBG institution, the good for sale was announced
prior to the auction. The order in which goods were sold in the GBG auctions was determined
randomly prior to the first auction phase.
The auctions were hand-run, with bidding cards for three phases distributed to
participants at the start of the session. In all sessions, treatment specific instructions on the
bidding process were distributed to participants and read aloud by the experimenters. An
example of allocation through the second-price rule was discussed in detail. After reading the
instructions, but before submitting bids, subjects had the opportunity to visually inspect the
goods22.
In addition to the auction, each session included a risk elicitation exercise, and a short
survey. The risk elicitation closely followed the protocol developed by Holt and Laury (2002)
and consisted of a series of 10 binary choices, each between a safe and risky lottery. The payoffs
were $200 and $160 for the safe lottery, and $385 and $10 for the risky lottery. The probability
of gaining the higher payout increased from 10% to 100% across the ten choices as is standard
with this protocol. In this implementation subjects were paid with a one-third probability, with
the outcome determined independently across subjects after the questionnaire was completed. To
22

The full instructions are available upon request.
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determine payoffs, experimental monitors would (i) roll a 10-sided die to pick one of the
questions for potential payment and (ii) roll a 6-sided die to determine if subjects were paid
based on their response to the selected question. Subjects were paid the outcome of their choice
if a 1 or 2 resulted from the die roll and received nothing otherwise.
The final element of each session was the completion of a survey which included (i) the
collection of demographic data, (ii) the elicitation of personality traits, and (iii) the cognitive
reflection test (CRT), which contains three questions intended to measure impulsivity and
intelligence (Frederick 2005). Subjects received $2 for each of the CRT questions answered
correctly. A series of 40 questions contained in the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP)
were used to measure the traits of assertiveness, sociability, performance motivation, risk-taking,
confidence, beliefs about intelligence, and efficacy. The personality items were measured using a
five-point Likert scale.

4.2 Field Results
Figure 1.123 illustrates that most of our participants are risk averse; it shows the
proportion of participants in each risk preference group. T-tests show that the proportions are
statistically different between auction types for the risk-loving group (p-value = 0.04), but not for
the risk-neutral or risk averse groups (p-values = 0.87 and 0.15 respectively). Since risk posture
is irrelevant for GBG auctions and BC participants are highly risk averse, we expect BC theory
to hold.
Each participant was asked to rank the 3 goods from “Most Preferred” (a ranking of 1) to
“Least Preferred” (a ranking of 3). Figure 1.2 demonstrates that while the IPod package was
preferred over the wine and hiking packages, the preferences are very similar between BC and
GBG auctions. However, we do find a significant difference in preferences between treatments
for the hiking and IPod packages (p-values = 0.02 and 0.01 respectively). The wine package
preferences are not statistically different between treatments (p-value = 0.81). Since revenues are
23

All figures are in Appendix C.
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driven by those who have the highest values for each good, we also examine the proportions of
participants who ranked each good as their most preferred (illustrated in Figure 1.3). The
proportions are not statistically different between treatments for the hiking or wine packages (pvalues = 0.09 and 0.11 respectively), but are statistically different for the IPod package (p-value
= 0.00). Again, however, we do find that the ordering of the goods is the same across treatments.
We acknowledge that a difference in preferences could affect our results in part; however, we
show later in the section that it is not the primary cause for our main findings.
Since the majority of our auction participants are risk averse, BC theory tells us to expect
higher revenues from the BC auctions than the GBG auctions. However, we do not find a
significant difference in revenues between the two types of auctions (t-test p-value= 0.61). Table
1.124 includes average revenues for each phase and average market revenues. The average
revenues in the GBG markets are not statistically different between phases, ruling out any order
or wealth effects.
In case a lack of variation in preferences is driving the result, we temporarily eliminate
any markets where all participants’ most preferred good was the same. One GBG auction and
four BC auctions meet this condition. The remaining markets’ revenues are reflected in Table
1.2. BC auctions yield higher revenue than GBG auctions, but the difference is not significant (pvalue = 0.78). Although this result is more in line with theory, we expected BC revenues to be
significantly higher than GBG revenues.

RESULT 1: In contrast to theoretical prediction, the bidder’s choice auction does not raise
higher revenue than the good-by-good auction in the field experiment.

To further explore why our results are not in line with theory, we examine bidding
behavior. We would expect that the third phase of BC auctions would have the same result as
GBG auctions since both are second-price auctions for one good. The average bids for GBG
24
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auctions and Phase 3 of BC auctions are compared in Table 1.3. The IPod package never made it
to the third phase in the BC auctions. We cannot reject that the average bid in GBG auctions is
different from the average bid in the 3rd phase of BC auctions for wine (t-test p-value= 0.17,
Mann-Whitney p-value= 0.30). However, we do reject the null for hiking at the 5% level: the
average bid in GBG auctions is significantly higher than the average bid in the 3 rd phase of BC
auctions (t-test p-value= 0.01, Mann-Whitney p-value= 0.06). What might have happened during
the course of the BC auctions to cause bidders to bid less in the 3rd phase than in GBG auctions
for the same good? One major difference in the format of BC auctions relative to GBG auctions
is that 1st and 2nd placed bidders in BC auctions get feedback.
We hypothesize that bidders in BC auctions may have changed their values for the goods
over time. Past lab experiments have shown that BC auctions result in higher revenues, but the
authors assume that the value a participant has for a good at the start of the auction remains the
same throughout; participants are assigned a value and this cannot change during the experiment.
It is easily possible, however, that participants in our field experiment update their values based
on others’ bids. A participant may see the winner in the first or second phase choose a good other
than the one they believed was most valuable. Since all participants are aware of the secondhighest bid (the amount the winner pays), the participant may believe he made a mistake judging
the value of the good.
In addition to the monetary values of the goods, the participant may update his belief on
the relative values of the goods. For instance, if a participant sees the IPod and the wine
packages get chosen in the first and second phases, he may update his belief on the popularity of
hiking relative to listening to music and drinking wine. If he finds that hiking is not as popular an
activity as he originally believed, he may not bid as high for the good. Finally, a participant may
get discouraged in an BC auction by watching others winning over him and choosing their
favorite goods. In a GBG market, on the other hand, a participant may not be discouraged by
losing in an auction for his least favorite good; he knows he was not really trying to compete
with the other participants for that good.
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We also analyze the revenues in GBG auctions versus the last phase of BC auctions and
the findings are in line with the comparison of the bids (see Table 1.4). We cannot reject the null
hypothesis that there is a difference in revenues for wine (t-test p-value= 0.88, Mann-Whitney pvalue= 0.93). We can reject the null for hiking, but only at the 10% significance level when using
a t-test (t-test p-value= 0.08, Mann-Whitney p-value= 0.04). We further investigate behavior by
analyzing bids in more detail.
Next, we examine the first phase of BC auctions in comparison with GBG auctions. We
would expect that bidders would shade their bids in the first phase of BC auctions and, in fact,
they do (see Table 1.5). Bids are compared between GBG and Phase 1 of BC by declared most
preferred good. In other words, the first column includes the average bid in Phase 1 of BC for
participants who preferred the hiking package and the average bid in GBG “Hiking” auctions for
participants who preferred the hiking package. The average bid for the most preferred good in
GBG auctions is not significantly higher than in the first phase of BC auctions for the wine and
hiking packages. We cannot reject the null in t-tests or Mann-Whitney tests at the 5% or 10%
levels. However, the difference is significant for the IPod at the 10% level (t-test p-value= 0.08,
Mann-Whitney p-value= 0.08). Note that current theory does not specify how much bidders will
shade during the first phase of an BC auction, but just that they will decrease their bid from their
true value. This is what we observe.

RESULT 2: Although some anomalies exist, bidding behavior is generally in line with theory
when comparing 1st and 3rd phase bids between BC and GBG in the field experiment.

We further analyze bidding behavior by calculating the change in bids for each
participant over time in BC auctions. Table 1.6 displays the change in bids for individuals whose
most preferred good is still available in the next phase. For instance, the first cell displays the
average change in bids between Phase 1 and Phase 2 for participants whose most preferred good
is the hiking package if the hiking package is still available (the hiking package was not chosen
25

by the first winner). We find mixed support for the theory here; some bidders decreased their
bids and some increased. We would have expected all bidders to increase their bids if their
preferred good was still available.
To delve deeper, we examine how bidders change their bids by initial rank. Table 1.7
summarizes the results. Each bidder was ranked from highest bid (rank=1) to lowest bid (rank=5
or 6 depending on number of participants in the market) in each phase. We find that bidders who
were ranked 2nd lower their bids on average for the next phase. Bidders who were ranked 2nd
knew their rank because the price paid by the winner was announced. Bidders who were ranked
greater than 2nd did not know their rank, but did know that they were not ranked first or second.
It turns out that bidders who were ranked 2nd were responsible for drops in bids; bidders ranked
3, 4 or 5 increased their bids on average.
This contradicts the traditional theory; bids should continue to increase in each phase
when the bidder’s most preferred good is still available. In phases prior to the last phase, bidders
should shade their bids just enough so that they are indifferent between winning and facing the
lottery that occurs in the last phase. As phases progress, this shading should become less and
less, assuming the most preferred good is still available. (In the last phase, which is essentially a
good-by-good auction for the remaining good, bidders should bid their value.) This result leads
to speculation over whether bidders may have updated their expectations of the goods’ values as
new information, such as the first good selected, was revealed. For instance, one subject may
believe that the Wine package would be the most popular (and therefore possibly easier to
resell), but is surprised when the winner in the first phase chooses the iPod. The subject now
lowers his private value for the Wine, even though his bid should theoretically increase in the
second phase. This updating cannot be controlled in the field setting since we do not observe
private values. Consequently, it is difficult to conclude why exactly the BC institution did not
raise higher revenues than GBG auctions. This difficulty motivates the second portion of this
research, the laboratory experiment, which will be discussed in later sections.
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RESULT 3: Bidders who are ranked 2nd in the BC auction in Phase 1 decrease their bids in
Phase 2; this is definitely a contradiction of theory.

Next, we explore how demographics and personality measures affect bidding behavior
using regression analysis. We find that when a bidder’s most preferred good or second most
preferred good is still available in an BC auction, he increases his bid, as expected. Bidders also
increase their bids significantly in GBG auctions for their most preferred goods. Table 1.8
provides these regression results. In addition, we find that sociability25 is a significant negative
predictor of BC bids whereas confidence has a significantly positive impact on GBG bids.
As expected, an indicator for a risk-averse individual is significant in predicting BC bids
but not GBG bids. However, the direction of impact is not in line with theory; risk-averse
individuals should bid more than risk neutral or risk seeking individuals because they do not
want to risk losing their preferred good. Instead, we find that risk-averse individuals bid less.
Rather than having aversion to losing their preferred good, our bidders are averse to paying too
much for a good. According to theory, BC auctions produce higher revenues only if bidders are
risk averse. The negative coefficient on our risk aversion indicator could partially explain why
we see equivalent revenues between the two auction types.
We also examine how bidders behave in comparison with theory by constructing an
indicator for circumstances where bids should have increased in BC auctions. If a participant’s
most preferred good is still available, they should always increase their bid in the next phase.
They should also increase their bid if their least favorite of the remaining goods gets chosen. For
instance, if the order (by preference) of goods taken for a participant is “1, 3, 2” (most preferred
good taken in 1st phase, least preferred good taken in 2nd phase, 2nd most preferred good taken in
3rd phase), the participant should increase his bid from the 2nd phase to the 3rd phase. If the
preference order of goods taken is “2 1 3”, the participant should increase his bid from the 1 st
phase to the 2nd phase, but theory is silent on what he should do from the 2nd phase to the 3rd
25

Sociability and confidence are personality measures derived from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP)
questions mentioned previously.
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phase (it depends on how much he has been shading and the difference in value to him of the
goods).
We find that in more than half of cases (54%) where theory predicts a bid increase in BC
auctions, participants actually decrease their bids or leave their bids unchanged. This result alone
demonstrates that the theoretical BC bidding strategy is not followed in the field, regardless of
where BC versus GBG preferences or revenues stand. One could argue that participants do not
understand the optimal BC bidding strategy. However, we already saw that BC bidders are, in
fact, shading their bids across the board (for all goods) during the first phase. It seems quite
unlikely that this could be a coincidence; instead, participants probably underestimated how
much other bidders would shade or made emotional decisions based on the outcomes of each
phase. This caused theory to break down during the second and third phases.
Table 1.8 reports the effects of demographics and personality measures on an indicator of
whether a participant increased their bid. A Probit model is used and the sample is restricted to
instances where theory says the participants’ bids should have increased. An indicator for aboveaverage education is significant but in the opposite direction from what one might expect;
participants are less likely to increase their bid when they should if they are educated. This may
be due to over-analyzing the bidding strategy. The results of an IQ quiz are more intuitive;
smarter participants are more likely to increase their bids when they should. Confidence, efficacy
and sociability are also significant predictors of how likely a participant is to follow theory.
Notice that our indicator for risk aversion still has a negative coefficient, though not significant
here.
As previously discussed, it is difficult to determine exactly why theory broke down in
this field study. As is the nature of field studies, private values are unknown; further, any
updating of private values are also unknown. Contradictory to theory, risk aversion does not
appear to play a role, as it is insignificant in our econometric analysis regardless of how the
parameter is defined.26 Further, we observe bidding paths that are illogical, unless participants’
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Using the results of our Holt and Laury style risk elicitation, we tried defining the risk parameter in several
different ways, including an indicator for very risk averse subjects, an indicator for mildly or very risk averse
subjects, a numeric variable which reports how many “safe” choices the subject chose, an indicator for subjects
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private values changed throughout the auction. These inconsistencies motivate the second stage
of our research: the laboratory experiment. In the lab, we are able to control values by inducing
them. Further, we can isolate possible confounding points which have not yet been explicitly
tested in the literature. Specifically, we isolate price revelation (providing information on the
prices of winning goods, which may have led to some of the aforementioned behavioral biases),
and persistent competition (subjects having value for multiple goods). As discussed in the second
section, previous work has focused on bidder’s choice auctions where participants dropped out
after their only preferred good had been chosen. In our field study, however, it is quite plausible
that participants had values for all three packages. In the next section, we illustrate theoretically
why this may cause the bidder’s choice mechanism to be less superior than previously thought.

V.

Lab Experiment

5.1 Experimental Design
Our experimental approach closely follows Eliaz et al. (2008), though our dimensions of
variation differ to focus on the effects of information and multi-good demand. In one set of
treatments, bidders are informed of the winning price (the second-highest bid) in each phase
(referred to as “I” treatments), whereas other treatments do not provide this information (referred
to as “NI” treatments). In another set of treatments, bidders draw random values for three goods
in each round (multi-good demand – “MG”), while in single-good demand treatments (“SG”),
bidders only draw a random value for one good in each round. All of these treatments are tested
using a bidder’s choice, or right-to-choose, auction (“BC”) and a standard sequential good-bygood auction (“GBG”). This 2x2x2 design yields a total of eight treatments.
Values were drawn from a uniform distribution over the support [1, 100]. For SG
treatments, three sets of preferred goods (values) were drawn ex ante and used repeatedly for
who chose more safe choices than average, an indicator for subjects who reported consistent risk preferences (did
not switch back and forth between the risky choices and the safe choices), etc.
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different groups. For MG treatments, we varied the order of the sets of values for different
groups to control for ordering effects. Consistent with Eliaz et al. (2008), we did this to ensure
that differences in revenue are attributable to differences in behavior rather than differences in
the vectors of random variables generated.
Eight sessions (one for each treatment) were executed at the University of Tennessee,
Knoxville (UTK) and eight sessions (one for each treatment) were executed at the University of
Alaska, Anchorage (UAA) in April 2012. The experimental laboratories at the two universities
have similar recruiting procedures, attracting undergraduate students from a variety of
disciplines. Four groups of six bidders each occupied the laboratory for each of the sessions held
in Tennessee. Due to capacity constraints, two or three groups of six bidders participated in each
of the eight treatments in Alaska. There were a total of 324 participants. The sessions lasted
about 70 minutes and most participants earned between 15 and 40 U.S. dollars in total27. Table
1.9 displays the experimental design.
The experimental sessions proceeded as follows. First, the subjects were asked to
participate in a risk elicitation similar to the one popularized by Holt and Laury (2002).
Instructions for the risk elicitation were read aloud while subjects followed along with on-screen
instructions. The computer program then allowed the subjects to make 10 risk decisions, one of
which would be selected at random and paid out at the end of the session28. Next, the subjects
were given hard copies of the auction instructions and asked to read along while the instructions
were read aloud29. The subjects were encouraged to ask clarifying questions before the
experiment began. The subjects were randomly assigned into groups of 6 and were unaware of
the identities of the other 5 participants in their group.
The experiment consisted of a practice round, followed by 10 paid rounds. In each round,
there were 3 phases. In BC treatments, each phase was an auction for a right to choose30. In GBG
27

This total includes earnings from all 10 auction rounds plus earnings from a risk elicitation.
We elicited the risk preferences of the subjects prior to the experiment to ensure that their responses were not
affected by their experiences of wins and losses during the experiment. We did not reveal the results of the risk
elicitation until the end of the session to avoid any endowment effects.
29
The instructions and screen shots from the experiment are available upon request.
30
Note, however, that the last phase was identical to a good-by-good auction for the remaining good.
28
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treatments, each phase was a standard auction for one of the goods (the goods were labeled “A”,
“B” and “C”). Bidders were instructed to submit bids ranging from zero to their value. In GBG
auctions, the highest possible bid was a subject’s value for the good being auctioned. In BC
treatments, the highest possible bid was a subject’s highest value (in SG treatments, the subject’s
highest value was also their only value). We did not allow the subjects to overbid in order to
decrease the effect of cognitive mistakes. While learning effects have been the focus of other
experimental work, we are focused on cleanly identifying the effects of multi-good demand and
information. This arrangement also minimized bankruptcy. A small percentage of subjects in BC
treatments did still go bankrupt due to choosing the wrong good31. In these cases, if the subject
did not recover from the loss, we paid the subject a show-up fee. Eliminating these subjects from
the data does not significantly change the results.
After each phase, all bidders were informed whether they won. In BC treatments, all
bidders were also informed of the good that was chosen by the winner in their group. In “I”
(information) treatments, all bidders were informed of the price of the good sold in their group
(the second-highest bid). No subject was ever told the name or ID number of any other subjects
in their group so they could not infer that one particular person won more or less often. In SG
treatments, subjects whose preferred good sold in phase 1 or 2 “dropped out” of the auction; they
faced a screen that read, “Please wait while the other members of your group bid in Phase …”. In
the GBG SG treatments (good-by-good auctions where bidders only have positive value for one
good), subjects only bid in phases when their preferred good was auctioned. For instance, a
subject who preferred good B faced a screen in the first phase that said, “Please wait while good
A is auctioned.” In MG treatments, all subjects participated in every phase.
31

For example, suppose a subject’s values are 80, 60 and 40, the subject bids 51 and wins. For simplicity, further
suppose that the second-highest bid (price) is 50. If he chooses the good that he values at 40, he receives negative
10 tokens. If he chooses the good that he values at 60, he receives positive 10 tokens, but this is inferior to
choosing the good that he values at 80, which yields positive 30 tokens. Choosing any good other than the most
preferred is illogical given our experimental design. However, as mentioned earlier, Harstad (2010) theorizes that a
bidder may choose a good that is not his most preferred if he believes the good is a “usual favorite”. The bidder’s
motive is to eliminate the most popular good in hopes of obtaining his most preferred good in a later round for a
low price. In our experiment, all values are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution so there is not a “usual
favorite”. However, it is possible that a few subjects misunderstood the implications of random drawings and
wanted to test Harstad’s theory as a potential strategy. As stated, this behavior only occurred in a few cases and
does not appear to affect our overall results.
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Earnings consisted of the subject’s value (randomly drawn) minus the price they paid for
the good (the second-highest bid). All values and prices were expressed in tokens. In SG
treatments, each 8 tokens equaled one dollar; in MG treatments, each 4 tokens was equal to a
dollar. The different exchange rates were based on the fact that equilibrium earnings must be less
in MG treatments32. Earnings were totaled over the 10 rounds. In the final stage of the
experiment, the risk elicitation results were revealed and each subject’s total earnings were
calculated. Subjects were paid in cash and in private.

5.2 Laboratory Results
First, we simply compare the average revenues (sum of prices paid) for each BC
treatment to its GBG counterpart. These values are displayed in Table 1.10. BC revenues are
significantly higher than GBG revenues, as expected. T-tests reveal no significant revenue
differences between any information treatment and its “no information” (“NI”) counterpart (i.e.
no significant difference between BC – I – SG and BC – NI – SG or between GBG – I – MG and
GBG – NI – MG, etc.). Hence, for the following comparisons, we pool information conditions.
The difference between single and multi-good demand is significant, as expected (t-test p-values
are 0.000). This result is a consequence of the fact that more values in MG treatments than SG
treatments necessarily decreases the gap between the highest and second-highest values in any
phase, thereby raising prices. This also decreases bidder surplus and is the reason for the
differing exchange rates between the two treatment groups.
The interesting result lies in the difference in the differences between BC and GBG
revenues by type of demand. Put differently, the revenue premium of the bidder’s choice
mechanism (compared to the benchmark GBG auction) is larger when bidders only have demand
32

In SG treatments, there were 6 random values drawn per group per round. In MG treatments, there were 18
random values drawn per group per round. Due to the increased number of draws, the spread between the
highest and second-highest values at any given time in MG treatments was, on average, much less than in an SG
treatment. (Recall from the theory that the revenue in MG auctions must be higher than SG auctions, given that
the same value for the preferred good. The idea is the same here: values were drawn from the same support for
both MG and SG auctions, but since more values were drawn in MG auctions, the demand for each good is
essentially higher.) The specific exchange rates of 8 and 4 tokens per dollar were determined based on earnings in
a pilot session held prior to the experiment.
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for one good. We compare the BC—GBG difference in the top two rows in Table 10 (SG
treatments) to the BC—GBG difference in the bottom two rows (MG treatments). While the BC
revenue premium is statistically significant in both cases (p-values = 0.000), the difference is
significantly larger for SG treatments. To see this visually, refer to Figure 1.4. The difference in
the differences is statistically significant (48.28, (SE = 4.22) for SG and 18.29 (SE = 2.53) for
MG). This is consistent with our theoretical prediction that risk averse bidders do not raise their
bids as high (over the risk-neutral bid) under multi-good demand as under single-good demand.
The risk elicitation demonstrates that the majority of participants are risk averse; the
results are displayed in Figure 1.5. A risk neutral subject would have switched from the lottery to
the certainty equivalent at either Row 8 or Row 9 (the two darker shaded columns in the figure).
However, we see many subjects choosing the certainty equivalent prior to Row 8, indicating risk
aversion33.

RESULT 4: While there is no treatment effect associated with the information treatment, there
is a significant consequence of multi-good demand. There is a revenue premium for the bidder’s
choice mechanism regardless of single-good or multi-good demand, but the premium for multigood demand is significantly smaller. This is consistent with theory.

Due to the fact that bids in multi-good demand treatments are necessarily higher than bids
in single-good demand treatments (a result of the larger number of values drawn), we can only
compare bidding behavior between the two treatments by using the benchmark GBG auction as a
baseline for each treatment, as we have done to analyze revenues. Table 1.11 compares the first
phase BC bid for each type of competition alongside the GBG bid for the subject’s most
preferred good (i.e. if the subject’s most preferred good is “A”, then this is his first phase bid; if
the subject’s most preferred good is “B”, then this is his second phase bid, etc.). This comparison
allows us to analyze each bidder’s bid based on his highest value. The first phase BC bids are
33

The complete instructions for the risk elicitation and screen shots displaying the ten choices faced by
participants are available upon request.
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significantly less than the GBG benchmark for both single and multi-good demand (p-values are
0.047 and 0.001 respectively). This demonstrates that the general bidder’s choice model holds
for our experiment: bidders shade their bids from their values in the first phase.
The difference in the BC and GBG bids is larger for multi-good demand (3.18) than
single-good demand (2.75), though the difference in the differences is not significant. Recall that
the theoretical risk neutral bid is higher for MG than SG given the same value for the most). On the other hand, risk aversion causes less

preferred good (from the theoretical section:

of an upward force on bids in MG than SG. Hence, we cannot draw any conclusions from this
difference and difference comparison.
Table 1.12 provides the BC bids for single and multi-good demand. The data used
includes bids where a subject’s most preferred good is still available. When bidders only have
value for one good (SG treatments), this includes all bids until a bidder drops out 34. This allows
us to see how the bidding path for the most preferred good progresses. Notice that the average
highest value decreases from Phase 1 to Phase 2 and again from Phase 2 to Phase 3. This reflects
the fact that some bidders drop out of the auction because they either win or their most preferred
good is taken by another bidder.
The progression of bids (as a percentage of value) in multi-good demand treatments is
significantly flatter than in single-good demand treatments (Phase 1 p-value = 0.00, Phase 2 pvalue = 0.04, Phase 3 p-value = 0.04). Again, there are two effects at work: the theoretical bid as
a proportion of value is higher (than SG), but the effects of risk aversion should be muted.
Overall, we observe that subjects bid very high percentages of their values in multi-good
demand; as we have already seen, this ultimately leads to higher revenue than the multi-good
benchmark. Thus, subjects must be bidding higher than the risk neutral bid. Average bids in the
third phase are slightly below average values for both SG and MG treatments. We find that this
is the case in the benchmark GBG auctions as well; we turn to this analysis next.
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In SG treatments, a bidder drops out when his most preferred good is no longer available. In MG treatments, a
bidder continues to bid when his most preferred good is no longer available; at this point, his bid cannot be higher
than his second-highest value. For comparison’s sake, we limit the MG observations to bidders whose most
preferred good is available in the phase of interest.
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RESULT 5: Bidding behavior in the lab experiment is generally in line with theory. The bid
paths (calculated as bid/value for subjects whose most preferred good is still available)
significantly differ between single and multi-good demand.

Table 1.13 provides the theoretical bids for the benchmark treatments (which are the
values) alongside the actual bids. Subjects consistently bid a few tokens below their values in the
benchmark treatments. Interestingly, this shading is more pronounced under single-good demand
than multi-good demand. The average percentage of value that was bid is significantly higher in
MG treatments than SG treatments in each phase (p-value = 0.000 for Phase 1, p-value = 0.000
for Phase 2, p-value = 0.004 for Phase 3)35. Multi-good demand has an effect on bidding in the
benchmark treatments as well as the bidder’s choice treatments. However, this effect is purely
behavioral; there is no theoretical foundation for bidding less than value in a second-price goodby-good auction.
In light of this behavioral discovery, we retest revenues to reflect optimal behavior in the
benchmark treatments. That is, we compare bidder’s choice revenues to the theoretical
benchmark revenue; if bidders had behaved according to theory in GBG auctions, would our
main result hold? Figure 1.6 displays this new information. We find that our revenue result is, in
fact, robust to GBG behavioral biases. The difference between the bidder’s choice (BC) revenue
and the benchmark (GBG) revenue is significant for both single and multi-good demand.
Additionally, the difference in these differences is also significant; the revenue premium is
significantly reduced when bidders value more than one good.
In the final part of our analysis, we use econometric methods to demonstrate how risk
preferences, variance over values and individual characteristics affect bidding behavior. Our
model focuses on the first and second phase BC bids where a subject’s most preferred good is
available and GBG bids for the most preferred good, allowing us to compare outcomes between

35

The actual difference in tokens between PC and NPC is also statistically significant for the first two phases (3.72
is a significantly larger difference than 1.31, etc.). We tend to focus on percentage differences, however, because
the risk neutral theoretical predictions provide bids in terms of proportion of value.
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persistent and non-persistent competition. We know that no subject has a value of zero for their
most preferred good, so a bid of zero is never optimal in our model; we do not need to control for
left-hand censoring. It is also never optimal for a subject to bid more than 100% of his value so
the fact that the bids are capped at 100% should not cause a bias. Therefore, we use simple linear
models with errors clustered at the individual bidder level to analyze bidding behavior. Alevy et
al. (2010) use a Tobit model to allow for corner solutions where a subject’s optimal bid is zero.
In their model, however, they incorporate bids for all available goods, which include goods that
may have no value to the bidder. Our use of induced values in a laboratory experiment, on the
other hand, allows us to focus on Phase 1 bids (

and

from the theory section), which drive

revenues.
Table 1.14 presents the OLS estimates. The baseline for the model is the benchmark
GBG auction. We use subjects’ bids as a percentage of subjects’ highest values as the dependent
variable. Since theory predicts a bidder’s BC bid should be a fraction of their value, this
approach allows us to explore how various characteristics affect bidding behavior. We find that
the bidder’s choice mechanism lowers bids as compared to the benchmark by about 12% of the
subject’s value for single-good demand and about 13% for multi-good demand (during the first
phase).
We also find that subjects increase their bids significantly as the experiment progresses,
but at a decreasing rate (the coefficient on “Round” is positive and significant, while the
coefficient on “Round2” is negative and significant). As expected (though contrary to the field
study), subjects raise their bids in the second phase if their preferred good is still available; the
interaction term for the BC treatment and the second phase has a positive, significant coefficient
for single-good demand36. This interaction term is not significant for multi-good demand. This is
probably due to the fact that the optimal bidding path is flatter for multi-good demand than
single-good demand (as long as the most preferred good is available), as seen in Table 1.12.
Thus, the effect is more subtle.
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We do not analyze phase differences for the benchmark because: (i) theoretically, drawing the highest value for
good “B” versus good “A” or good “C” should not affect bids and (ii) we see from Table 5 that, in fact, bids in each
benchmark treatment are not significantly different between phases.
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Additionally, we find that grade point average has a positive and slightly significant
effect on the percentage of value bid under multi-good demand. Contrary to expectation, an
indicator for the variance of a subject’s values in multi-good demand is not significant. This
suggests that subjects may exhibit a threshold bias. It may be the case that bidders perceive any
positive values for their lesser preferred goods to be the same (versus zero values in SG
treatments); i.e. the subject considers that he has a chance to earn surplus in later rounds, but
does not consider what that surplus may be. If this is the case, the effects of risk aversion would
be muted.
Finally, we also control for risk preferences. We do not expect that risk preference should
have an effect in the benchmark, so the fact that this variable is not statistically significant is not
a surprise. However, we also interact risk preference with BC; this variable is not significant as
well, contrary to expectation. It is possible that the risk elicitation we used was too coarse of a
measure to pick up on the differences in risk preference which might affect bidding behavior.
The other possibility is that the behavioral bias proposed by Eliaz et al. (2008) could
theoretically bias bids, though we argue in the discussion that this is extremely unlikely37.

VI. Discussion

Bidder’s choice auctions have been shown to yield higher revenue than simple good-bygood auctions. Theoretically, this is a result of risk aversion, but Eliaz et al. (2008) find evidence
to support the bidder’s choice premium is partially the result of a behavioral bias, causing
subjects to believe they are competing with more people than they actually are. In SG scenarios,
this bias is plausible and could theoretically be responsible for the BC revenue premium.
However, this bias almost certainly would not affect bidding behavior in MG scenarios because
bidders would need to believe that they were competing with people that do not actually exist.
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We also test for endogeneity of risk preference and find that it is not endogenous.
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Since we do find a revenue premium in our MG treatments, we conclude that the premium is the
result of risk aversion, not a behavioral bias.
While the field experiment did not reveal a revenue premium, the laboratory experiment
results show that the revenue premium of the bidder’s choice mechanism is significantly greater
under single-good than multi-good demand. Bidding behavior is generally consistent with the
theory and we find that price revelation does not have a significant effect. This suggests that
multi-good demand, not information, is probably the reason that our field study finds results that
are at odds with previous work.
In conclusion, we find that multi-good demand mutes the revenue superiority of the
bidder’s choice institution, consistent with the notion that the perceived risk of losing one’s most
preferred good is softened when there is a chance to win multiple goods. This result implies that
bidder’s choice auctions should be used in settings where each bidder is likely to strongly prefer
one of the goods over the others, though this need not be the same good for every bidder. This
conclusion is consistent with Burguet’s (2005) result that greater taste diversity leads to greater
revenue. In addition, the results explain why our field experiment finds contrasting results to a
previous field study conducted by Alevy et al (2010): our field environment is arguably a case of
multi-good demand, which mutes the revenue superiority of the mechanism, while the greater
taste diversity (closer to single-good demand) that characterizes Alevy et al. 2010 leads the
authors to find substantial support for theory.
Future work may include additional field or lab experiments to cleanly distinguish
behavioral biases from risk aversion; a more finely tuned and detailed risk elicitation than is
typically used may be helpful since the differences in bids may be very small. Interdependent
preferences for goods may also be an interesting extension. For example, a prospective landlord
who wins an auction for a condo on the seventh floor of a building may subsequently increase
his value for another condo on the same floor (i.e. the landlord’s preferences for goods depend
on the good(s) he has already acquired). This type of preference structure has implications for
broadcast spectrum auctions and plausibly many other applications.
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Appendix A
Theoretical Work
Proof of Proposition 1:
Here, we show that the variance of the second-phase lottery faced by bidders in the simple 2bidder, 2-good case is larger under single-good demand than multi-good demand.
We use the following formula for the variance of a lottery, where A and B are payoffs and Pr(A)
is the probability that outcome A occurs and Pr(B) is the probability that outcome B occurs.
(

)

( )

(

)

( )

Under single-good demand, the variance of the second-phase lottery equals:
(

) ( )

(

) ( )

Under multi-good demand, the variance of the second-phase lottery equals:
(

) ( )

(

(
Since

) ( )

(

) ( )

)( )

, it must be the case that

. Therefore,
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Appendix B
Tables

Table 1.1: Average Revenues
Phase 1
78.55
(23.08)
74.07
(29.96)

BC
GBG

Phase 2
64.69
(26.12)
55.51
(29.66)

Phase 3
50.16
(18.30)
75.27
(40.19)

Market
193.40
(53.49)
204.85
(67.96)

Table 1.2: Average Revenues (Using Only Markets with Variation in Most Preferred Good)
Phase 1
82.67
(23.93)
71.69
(29.78)

BC
GBG

Phase 2
71.59
(26.62)
49.77
(21.33)

Phase 3
51.26
(11.29)
77.21
(41.14)

Market
205.52
(53.87)
198.68
(66.53)

Table 1.3: Average Bids in GBG Auctions and 3rd Phase of BC Auctions

BC (3rd Phase)
GBG

Hiking
34.46
(20.62)
50.75
(41.40)

Wine
36.18
(23.47)
48.08
(40.65)

Table 1.4: Average Revenues in GBG Auctions and 3rd Phase of BC Auctions

BC (3rd Phase)
GBG

Hiking
45.92
(11.13)
58.93
(21.64)
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Wine
59.49
(28.07)
62.84
(43.97)

Table 1.5: Average Bids for Most Preferred Good in GBG and Phase 1 of BC

BC (in phase 1 by 1st
preferred good)
GBG (for 1st preferred)

Hiking
54.22
(38.85)
82.67
(53.45)

Wine
72.06
(38.24)
80.72
(49.77)

IPod
63.65
(49.27)
85.00
(61.86)

Table 1.6: Change in Bids for BC Auctions when Most Preferred Still Available in Next Phase

Change from Phase 1
to Phase 2
Change from Phase 2
to Phase 3
Both Phase Changes

Hiking
5.84
(10.21)
2.83
(3.71)
4.33
(7.49)

Wine
2.38
(17.44)
-23.50
(21.76)
-6.25
(22.03)

IPod
2.96
(19.30)
(.)
(.)
2.96
(19.30)

All
3.29
(17.45)
-7.70
(18.72)
1.00
(18.09)

Table 1.7: Change in Bids for BC when Most Preferred Still Available by Rank in Initial Period

Change from Phase 1
to Phase 2
Change from Phase 2
to Phase 3
Both Phase Changes

Rank = 2
-8.53
(22.60)
-4.00
(12.73)
-7.63
(20.47)

Rank = 3
5.73
(13.77)
2.00
(5.20)
5.07
(12.63)
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Rank = 4
13.20
(25.95)
-31.00
(.)
5.84
(29.40)

Rank = 5
5.13
(10.63)
2.00
(2.65)
4.27
(9.09)

Table 1.8: Effect of Demographics and Personality Measures on Bids

Most Preferred Wine
Most Preferred Hike
Most Preferred Ipod
Second Preferred Wine
Second Preferred Hike
Second Preferred Ipod
Wine
Ipod
Risk
Educ Above Average
Income Above Average
Iq Quiz
Assert
Motivation
Confidence
Efficacy
Social
constant

Dep. Var = BC Bids

Dep. Var = GBG Bids

41.03**
(8.73)
42.73**
(14.55)
36.76**
(7.03)
14.71**
(6.39)
14.12**
(5.84)
5.35
(14.03)
3.82
(8.03)
(omitted)

49.49**
(9.75)
53.28**
(15.29)
49.72**
(10.44)
6.49
(8.78)
17.80**
(8.19)
31.83**
(9.16)
-4.11
(7.13)
14.61**
(7.66)
-7.91
(9.12)
7.64
(7.48)
-3.27
(9.25)
1.11
(3.37)
-2.39
(1.64)
-1.42
(1.56)
4.41**
(1.99)
-1.95
(1.77)
-0.88
(1.17)
35.95**
(12.83)

-13.64**
(6.48)
3.22
(6.78)
6.45
(6.56)
4.05
(3.87)
2.76
(1.89)
0.07
(1.21)
-1.29
(1.51)
0.59
(1.74)
-1.95*
(1.14)
25.91**
(11.40)

Dep. Var = Indicator
for Increased Bid
---------0.30
(0.52)
-1.69**
(0.50)
0.74
(0.45)
0.58**
(0.25)
-0.01
(0.09)
0.07
(0.07)
-0.23**
(0.11)
-0.17*
(0.09)
0.15**
(0.07)
0.99
(0.79)

One asterisk (*) indicates statistical significance at the 10% level and two asterisks (**) indicates
significance at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are reported for
regressions in the 1st and 2nd columns. The last column reports the results of a Probit model where the
dependent variable indicates an increased bid from the prior period. The sample for this model is
restricted to instances where theory suggests bids should increase.
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Table 1.9: Experimental Design (Laboratory)
Treatment
BC – NI – SG
BC – I – SG
BC – NI – MG
BC – I – MG
GBG – NI – SG
GBG – I – SG
GBG – NI – MG
GBG – I – MG
Total

Number of UTK
groups
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
32

Number of UAA
groups
3
2
3
3
2
3
3
3
22

Subjects per
group
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
--

Total subjects
42
36
42
42
36
42
42
42
324

Table 1.10: Average Revenues
BC Treatment
BC – NI – SG
BC – I – SG
BC – NI – MG
BC – I – MG

Average Revenue
(Std. Dev.)
152.41
(36.63)
146.03
(37.15)
229.96
(20.22)
232.20
(19.14)

GBG Treatment
GBG – NI – SG
GBG – I – SG
GBG – NI – MG
GBG – I – MG

Average Revenue
(Std. Dev.)
105.68
(27.52)
97.34
(33.18)
211.37
(22.64)
214.20
(22.60)

Table 1.11: Average Bids by Treatment

Single-good Demand
Multi-good Demand

BC – 1st Phase
(Std. Err.)
48.94
(0.96)
71.06
(0.73)

GBG – Most Preferred
(Std. Err.)
51.69
(0.99)
74.24
(0.64)
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Difference
(Std. Err.)
2.75
(1.38)
3.18
(0.97)

Table 1.12: BC Auctions: Average Values and Bids

SG:
Phase 1
SG:
Phase 2
SG:
Phase 3
MG:
Phase 1
MG:
Phase 2
MG:
Phase 3

Average Highest Value
(Std. Dev.)

Average Actual Bid
(Std. Dev.)

54.78
(27.59)
50.78
(26.62)
42.35
(25.96)
75.83
(17.40)
72.96
(17.29)
69.53
(16.76)

48.94
(26.85)
46.29
(25.38)
39.42
(24.54)
71.06
(21.17)
68.49
(20.87)
66.55
(18.26)

Average
Bid / Value
(Std. Dev.)
0.892
(0.20)
0.916
(0.17)
0.934
(0.14)
0.935
(0.17)
0.938
(0.18)
0.959
(0.13)

The Average Highest Value column provides the average highest value remaining in the phase in
question; i.e. the value for subjects whose most preferred good is still available.
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Table 1.13: Good-by-Good (Benchmark) Auctions: Average Values and Bids

SG:
Phase 1
SG:
Phase 2
SG:
Phase 3
MG:
Phase 1
MG:
Phase 2
MG:
Phase 3

Average Value for
Most Preferred
(Std. Dev.)
54.82
(30.15)
54.38
(22.56)
55.14
(29.50)
79.65
(14.60)
70.38
(19.50)
77.84
(16.18)

Average Bid for
Most Preferred
(Std. Dev.)
51.10
(30.24)
51.55
(23.09)
52.42
(29.46)
78.34
(15.02)
69.09
(20.50)
75.62
(18.63)

Average
Value – Bid
(Std. Dev.)
3.72
(11.20)
2.83
(6.81)
2.72
(7.38)
1.31
(4.57)
1.30
(6.82)
2.22
(9.93)

Average
Bid / Value
(Std. Dev.)
0.927
(0.19)
0.932
(0.17)
0.933
(0.17)
0.984
(0.06)
0.980
(0.10)
0.972
(0.13)

The Average Value for Most Preferred is the mean value for the most preferred good. Since
Phase 1 was always an auction for good “A” in the benchmark treatments, the first cell in this
table provides the average value for subjects who preferred good “A” in SG treatments. The
fourth row down in the first column provides the average highest value for subjects whose most
preferred good was “A”. This table does not include bids for lesser preferred goods in MG (for
purposes of a clean comparison between SG and MG). Note that average values are also average
theoretical bids in the GBG auctions.
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Table 1.14: Estimates of Bidding Behavior

BC
Round
Round2
BC x Phase 2
Risk Preference
BC x Risk
Variance Indicator
Age
GPA
Gender
Constant
N
F
R2

Model 1:
Model 2:
Single-good Demand
Multi-good Demand
Dependent Variable = Bid / Value
-.119**
-.130**
(.055)
(.053)
.024***
.014***
(.006)
(.004)
-.001***
-.001***
(.000)
(.000)
.024***
.002
(.008)
(.009)
-.004
-.006
(.005)
(.005)
.012
.013
(.008)
(.008)
-.004
(.010)
.001
-.002
(.001)
(.001)
.012
.017*
(.009)
(.009)
.004
-.004
(.018)
(.014)
.808***
.950***
(.060)
(.043)
2080
2220
6.20
4.52
.036
.047

This table includes bids for the first phase of BC auctions and the second phase of BC auctions
when the subject’s most preferred good is still available. The table includes bids for GBG
auctions for each subject’s most preferred good. One asterisk, two asterisks, and three asterisks
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix C
Figures
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Figure 1.1: Proportions of Participants in Each Risk Preference Group
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Figure 1.2: Average Rankings for Each Good in Each Auction Format (1 = Most Preferred)
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Figure 1.3: Proportions of Participants Who Ranked Each Good as Their Most Preferred
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Figure 1.4: Average Revenues
The standard errors for SG treatments are: 2.71 for GBG and 3.23 for BC; the standard error for
the difference is 4.22. The standard errors for MG are: 1.91 for GBG and 1.66 for BC; the
standard error for the difference is 2.53.
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Figure 1.5: Risk Elicitation Results
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Figure 1.6: Average Revenues Including Theoretical GBG Revenues
The standard errors for SG treatments are: 2.50 for Theoretical GBG and 3.23 for BC; the
standard error for the difference is 2.66. The standard errors for MG are: 1.87 for Theoretical
GBG and 1.66 for BC; the standard error for the difference is 1.57.
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Appendix D
Instructions
This appendix includes the field instructions for the Bidder’s choice Auction and the laboratory
instructions for the Bidder’s choice Auction with Single-good Demand and Full Information.
Instructions for other treatments are available upon request.

Field Instructions
Welcome to Jonesie’s Auctions. You have the opportunity today to bid in an auction where we
will be selling the three bundles of goods displayed on the table in front of you. We will provide
you an opportunity to examine each of the items before the bidding begins. We ask that you do
not talk with any of the other participants during the session. If you have a question at any time
during the session, please raise your hand and a monitor will come to your seat and answer it in
private.

Description of the available goods
Good 1: I-Pod and Speakers



2 GB I-Pod Nano with 500 song capacity
JBL On Stage Micro portable music dock for I-Pod

Good 2: Hiking Equipment and Backpack




REI Ridgeline backpack
REI Hiker First Aid Kit
Katadyn Hiker Microfilter

Good 3: Riedel Wine Glasses and Wine







Set of 4 Riedel Chardonnay Glasses
One bottle of 2006 Laird Family Estate Carneros Chardonnay
Set of 4 Riedel Pinot Noir Glasses
One bottle of DuNah Vineyards Russian River Valley Pinot Noir
Set of 4 Riedel Cabernet/Merlot Glasses
One bottle of 2004 Chappallet Napa Valley Cabernet Sauvignon
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There are five bidders in this auction which will consist of three phases. Rather than sell the
goods one by one, we will sell ‘rights to choose’ one by one. If in any phase you win one of the
rights to choose, you will be able to choose which of the goods remaining at that time you want.
To be more precise, in each phase a ‘right to choose’ is sold to the highest bidder. In the first
phase, all five bidders will submit a bid for the first right to choose. The highest of these five
bidders wins the first right to choose and selects the good that he or she prefers. At the end of
the first phase, every bidder will be informed whether they won the first right to choose and
which good was selected by the winning bidder.
Once the winning bidder from the first phase has selected their preferred item, the second phase
starts. In the second phase all bidders will submit a new bid for the second right to choose. The
highest of these bids wins the second right to choose and selects the good that he or she prefers
from amongst the two remaining items. At the end of the second phase, every bidder will be
informed whether they won the second right to choose and which good was selected by the
winning bidder. In the third and final phase, all bidders will submit a new bid for the remaining
item. The highest bidder in the third phase will win the final item.

Auction Rules:
In each phase, you are asked to submit a bid indicating the maximum amount you are willing to
pay to acquire the ‘right to choose’ your most preferred item from the set of available items.
Bids may be submitted in intervals as fine as one cent although there is no restriction on the
amounts that you can bid. If you do not place a bid, it will be counted as a bid of zero dollars.
Once I have received bids from all five bidders, I will order them from highest to lowest to
determine the winner in that phase. The price that the winner in each phase pays depends on the
bids of the other participants in the market. To be precise, in each phase the individual that
submits the highest bid will be awarded the “right to choose” their preferred item for a price
equal to the second highest bid submitted for that phase. If you do not submit the highest bid,
you will not win the ‘right to choose’ in that phase and will not be asked to pay anything.
If two (or more) individuals submit the same high bid, then one of these bidders will be
randomly selected and awarded the “right to choose” for that phase. In such an instance, the
winner pays a price equal to their own bid amount.
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Example
If the bids in the first phase are ranked highest to lowest as follows:
$A

(bid from bidder A)

$D

(bid from bidder D)

$E

(bid from bidder E)

$B

(bid from bidder B)

$C

(bid from bidder C)

Bidder A would win the ‘right to choose’ his most preferred item from the set of three available
items and would pay a price equal the amount of the bid submitted by bidder D.
After Bidder A selected his most preferred item, the bidding process would be repeated with
everyone submitting a bid for the ‘right to choose’ their most preferred of the remaining two
items. If the bids in the second phase are ranked highest to lowest as follows:
$E

(bid from bidder E)

$C

(bid from bidder C)

$F

(bid from bidder F)

$B

(bid from bidder B)

$A

(bid from bidder A)

Bidder E would win the ‘right to choose’ his most preferred item from the set of two available
items and would pay a price equal the amount of the bid submitted by bidder C.
Once Bidder E selected her most preferred good, the bidding process would be repeated one final
time with bidders submitting a bid for the final item.
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Example
Before you submit your actual bids, I would like you to work through an example. Consider an
auction where the following bids were submitted in the first phase. We want you to determine
who will win the auction and how much they will pay to obtain the good.
Bidder 1’s First Bid = 1103¥
Bidder 2’s First Bid = 850¥
Bidder 3’s First Bid =1200¥
Bidder 4’s First Bid = 250¥
Bidder 5’s First Bid = 475¥

Take the two highest bids and order them from highest to lowest:
Highest Bid _______________

2nd Highest Bid ________________

Now, determine which bidder has won the first ‘right to choose’ and the amount that he or she
will have to pay. Fill in those numbers here.
Winning Bidder ____________

Amount Paid __________________

To assure that you understand how this auction mechanism operates, I will check your work after
you complete this example. Please raise your hand once you have completed the example.

Final Transaction:
The winners in each phase will be required to pay me (cash or check) for the items that they have
selected at the end of the session. Once I have received payment, the respective item will be
awarded to the winning bidder.
I understand that you may not have anticipated the need to bring cash or your checkbook with
you for this experiment. In the case that you do not have the necessary cash (or a check) to pay
for the items, we will provide you with a stamped envelope in which to mail the payment. Upon
receipt of your cash or check, I will send you the items that you won. All postage will be paid by
Jonesie’s Auctions for items mailed to the winners.
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Note that while this is a real auction for the items displayed on the table in front of you, I plan to
use data on the bids in this auction for economic research. I guarantee to sell all three of the
items to the winners of this five-bidder auction, whatever the final auction prices turn out to be.
Your bids represent binding commitments to purchase the items you win at the prices specified
by the auction outcomes.
Good luck – we now invite you to spend a few minutes examining the goods on the table at the
front of the room. Once you have examined the items, please return to your seats. Once
everyone has been seated, we will ask you to write your bid for the first phase on the sheet
provided.

Lab Instructions
Welcome to this experiment on economic decision-making! This experiment consists of 10
rounds plus 1 practice round. At the start of the session, you will be randomly assigned to a
group of 6 people and you will remain in this same group for all ten rounds. Importantly, you
will not know the identity of the other five participants in your group and the other participants
in your group will not know your identity. You will earn tokens in the experiment by purchasing
a good you value in a market. At the end of the experiment your tokens will be exchanged for
dollars. Each 8 tokens is equal to 1 dollar. Your total earnings in the experiment will equal the
sum of your earnings in all 10 rounds.

Values of the Goods
In each group, 3 goods will be available for sale in each round: good A, good B, and good C.
Each participant will have a positive value for only one of the goods in each round. Values for
this good are randomly determined and will lie between 1 and 100 tokens. That is each number
between 1 and 100 is equally likely to be assigned as your value. The other goods have no value
(=0 tokens) to the participant. Each participant will receive a different value for his or her
preferred good. The value of this good for each participant does not depend on the values of the
preferred goods for the other participants. You will have the opportunity to earn money by
purchasing your preferred good at a price less than your assigned value.
At the start of each round, you will be informed of which good you prefer and how much you
value it. You will not know the preferred goods or the values of the other participants and the
other participants will not know your preferred good or value. Among the 5 other participants in
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your group, there will be one other participant who prefers the same good as you do and his or
her value is also determined randomly from the interval between 1 and 100.
Which good a participant prefers changes (randomly) from round to round. This implies that the
person who prefers the same good as you will also change from round to round. Each participant
will receive a new value for the preferred good in each round. The value for a preferred good in
one round does not depend on the value for the preferred good in any other round.

Sale of the Goods
Rather than sell the goods one by one, the market will sell “rights to choose” one by one. If in
any phase you win one of the rights to choose, you will be able to choose which of remaining
goods you wish to purchase. To be more precise, in each phase a right to choose is sold to the
highest bidder. In the first phase, all six bidders will submit a bid for the first right to choose. The
highest of these six bidders wins the first right to choose and selects the good that he or she
prefers. At the end of the first phase, every bidder will be informed whether they won the first
right to choose and which good was selected by the winning bidder.
Once the winning bidder from the first phase has selected their preferred item, the second phase
starts. In the second phase the remaining bidders (whose preferred goods are still unsold) will
submit new bids for the second right to choose. The highest bidder wins the second right to
choose and selects the good that he or she prefers from amongst the two remaining goods. At the
end of the second phase, every bidder will be informed whether they won the second right to
choose and which good was selected by the winning bidder. In the third and final phase, the
remaining bidders (whose preferred good is still unsold) will submit new bids for the remaining
good. The highest bidder in the third phase will win the final good. This process will be repeated
in each of the ten rounds.

Prices of the Goods
In each phase, you will be asked to submit a bid indicating the maximum amount you are willing
to pay to acquire the “right to choose” your most preferred good from the set of available goods.
You may submit any number up to your value for your most preferred good. The price that the
winner in each phase pays depends on the bids of the other participants in the market. To be
precise, in each phase, the individual that submits the highest bid will be awarded the right to
choose their preferred good for a price equal to the second-highest bid submitted for that phase.
The profit to the bidder from winning will be equal to his or her value minus the price he or she
pays, so profit = (value – price). At the end of each phase, the price paid by the winning bidder
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will be announced to all six members of the group. If you do not submit the highest bid, you will
not win the right to choose in that phase and you will not pay anything.
If two (or more) individuals submit the same high bid, then one of these bidders will be
randomly selected and awarded the right to choose for that phase. In such an instance, the winner
pays a price equal to their own bid amount.

Example
Suppose the bids in the first phase are ranked highest to lowest as follows:
$A
$D
$E
$B
$C
$F

(bid from bidder A)
(bid from bidder D)
(bid from bidder E)
(bid from bidder B)
(bid from bidder C)
(bid from bidder F)

Bidder A would win the right to choose his most preferred good from the set of three available
goods and would pay a price equal the amount of the bid submitted by bidder D. After Bidder A
selects his most preferred good, the bidding process would be repeated with the remaining
bidders (whose preferred goods are still unsold) submitting a bid for the right to choose their
most preferred of the remaining two items.

Final Payout
At the end of the experiment, your total tokens earned will be displayed on your screen. You will
be asked to fill out a short, anonymous survey and then you will be paid in private. If you have
any questions at any time, please raise your hand.
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CHAPTER 2
A Dynamic Markov Tournament Model of Task Assignment and
Up-and-Down Competition for Status
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Abstract

We develop a dynamic Markov model to capture the incentives in indefinitely-repeated
tournaments in labor market settings where agents compete both to “move up” as well as to
avoid a “move down”. Such settings naturally arise regardless of whether explicit performance
incentives or an organizational hierarchy exist. We show that when monetary incentives are
available the dynamic tournament approaches the first-best outcome, but we also allow for the
possibility that the principal’s only available incentive mechanism is the assignment of
undesirable tasks to agents who are out-of-favor. Inability to change salaries or demote workers
is common for public organizations, such as government agencies and schools. For instance, a
school principal may not be able to monetarily reward or sanction teachers based on
performance, but typically has discretion within the labor contract to vary class assignments and
resources such as teacher’s aides. We model agents as being either in or out of favor with the
principal in any given period; those who are out of favor are assigned more undesirable tasks.
The prize of the tournament is the difference between groups (in favor and out of favor) in the
present value of the agent’s expected utility. We assume that agents’ effort cost of completing
contractible tasks is such that these costs are minimized by assigning equally burdensome tasks
to all agents. Therefore the principal can motivate non-contractible effort through differential
task assignment, but this entails an efficiency cost. The model demonstrates that employers may
seek flexibility to vary task assignments in labor contracts not only to adapt to changing
circumstances, but also to enable them to motivate non-contractible effort when agents’
compensation in fixed.
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I.

Introduction

Many situations are characterized by agents that compete for rank or status in an ongoing,
indefinite contest. Agents who outperform their peers may “move up”, while those who
underperform “move down”. The advantages of moving up as well as avoiding a move down
engender competition. In the workplace employees may work hard not only to compete for
promotions but also to avoid demotion, just as many sports leagues worldwide, such as the
English football league, employ a system of promotion and relegation in which a fixed number
of the lowest performing teams in the top league are demoted at the end of a season while the
highest performing teams in the second-tier league are promoted. Even in a fairly “flat” (i.e. nonhierarchical) organization such as a school, which may have little room for inducing effort or
performance through competition for rank or financial rewards, there nevertheless can be
significant consequences associated with being in or out of favor with the principal, such as class
assignments and the allocation of such scarce resources as teacher aides.
We develop an indefinite dynamic Markov tournament model with competition for status
within the organization. An agent’s utility payoff each period depends on his status, and each
period a fixed number of agents will be moved up and moved down in the organization. We
explicitly model the possibility that high status may be rewarded non-monetarily through the
principal’s discretion of task assignment. For example, in a school, teachers who are in favor
with the principal may be assigned more desirable classes to teach or provided additional
resources such as teacher’s aides. We show that when high status can be rewarded monetarily
and discounting is negligible this type of infinitely repeated dynamic tournament can function as
an efficient mechanism, inducing non-contractible effort without paying rents to agents, so that
first-best effort is obtained. We then show how differential assignment of contractible tasks can
similarly be employed to motivate non-contractible effort. However, if the agents’ cost of
contractible effort is a convex function, employing differential task assignment entails an
efficiency cost. The outcome is therefore second-best as the principal faces a tradeoff between
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implementing incentives to induce optimal non-contractible effort and obtaining completion of
necessary contractible tasks at least cost.
By demonstrating how competition for status which determines task assignments within
an organization can be employed as an incentive mechanism, our model offers a new perspective
on the value to an employer of flexibility over job assignments within labor contracts. Of course
a firm or other principal/employer is likely to value such flexibility for many reasons, such as
being better able to adapt to changing technology or market conditions. But our model illustrates
that contractual flexibility that gives a manager significant discretion over employees’ task
assignments yields an important motivational tool that can elicit greater effort for a workforce. In
this context, it is not surprising that unions may resist such flexibility, or demand compensation
for it, in labor negotiations1. Workers will recognize that if they accept a contract that permits
greater discretion in their assignments, this can compel them to exert more costly effort in the
competition for status that will be ongoing within the organization. Indeed, such negotiations
have occurred between UPS and the Teamsters union; a clause in one of their contracts reads:
“Job reassignments will be on an as-needed basis only, due to reduction or transfer of the work.
Seniority will be recognized in all job reassignments” (Teamster Local 150: UPS Contract
Updates). Further, the union states that one of their goals is “stronger language that strengthens
the rights of… workers to bid on overtime and job assignments” (Teamsters for a Democratic
Union: UPS Contract Scorecard).
Our theory represents a departure from existing dynamic models in the tournament
literature which, beginning with Rosen’s (1986) seminal work, have focused on elimination
tournaments in which competition is “up or out” and the game has a finite number of periods

1

Anecdotal evidence supports this: “Unions typically direct their job-description efforts toward setting defined
boundaries for positions, usually wanting to define the work that employees can perform within specific job
classifications” (Joinson 2001). It is also possible to think of task assignment in a broader sense that includes
schedule flexibility; a particularly undesirable task could be one that needs to be completed at night or on a
holiday (e.g. teaching an evening class). Zeytinolgu (2005) states, “… traditional union preference [includes]
regularity of work and/or skepticism regarding flexible scheduling, which they tend to view as a risk for losing
control to employers.” Further, a recent contract negotiated by the teacher’s union in New York highlights how the
city hopes to achieve higher quality in education by providing flexibility to schools in terms of work rules and
length of school day (New York Times Editorial Board 2014). This could be explained in part by the principals’
ability to incentivize more effort from teachers when they have more control.
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(because a hierarchy is inherently finite)2. Additionally, the present work significantly
complements work on public organizations (e.g. Gersbach and Keil, 2005; Heinrich and
Marschke, 2010; Perry and Porter, 1982), which emphasize that a manager’s ability to use
monetary incentives in a public organization (such as a government agency or school) is limited.
One potential non-monetary incentive is public recognition. According to Heinrich and
Marschke, there is some evidence that employees in the public sector may be particularly
motivated by public recognition relative to monetary compensation. Our model can be applied to
this context in that certain tasks or projects may be more likely to result in public recognition and
are therefore more desirable. To the best of our knowledge this literature has not considered how
a manager’s use of task assignments can be employed to generate competition for status and
thereby motivate performance and this is therefore one of our primary contributions3.
The relevance of our model for government agencies is potentially quite large. Several
pertinent aspects of government culture are characterized by Wilson (1989) in his text on
bureaucracy. First, he makes clear that managers in government have very limited ability to alter
pay or give promotions, but managers can "give people attractive or miserable job assignments"
(p. 156) as an alternative. Further, government job descriptions are so abstract that it is very
difficult for managers to justify bonuses even in the few circumstances when they do have the
ability to use money4. Wilson also points out that in certain branches, including military, the goal
is not only to use job assignment as a reward mechanism, but also to provide equal opportunities
2

To the best of our knowledge, with the exception of work by Liu and Neilson (2009) and Gilpatric, Vossler and Liu
(2013), both the indefiniteness of the game as well as the nature of the movement of players (i.e. both up and
down) has not been considered in previous tournament models. An important feature of our model relative to Liu
and Neilson (2009) is that we assume agents compete in separate tournaments according to their organizational
level, rather than in a single tournament. This simplifies the model dramatically (importantly, there is an analytical
solution), and significantly increases the amount of effort induced by competition. Just as crucial, given that
inducements for effort generally differ across levels, the single-tournament becomes a competition that only those
at a particular level are likely to win. This characterization does not appear to fit the settings we endeavor to
model very adequately.
3
Gersbach and Keil (2005) characterize a public organization where the principal does not have direct monetary
means to incentivize agents, similar to the current paper. However, the model developed by Gersbach and Keil
focuses on incentivizing agents to reveal unproductive tasks in their departments, not put forth effort per se.
4
Although fairly rare, sometimes managers in government are allowed to allocate a pot of bonus money among
their employees. Wilson cites an example from a report by the Weatherhead School of Management, where
“agency heads often gave small bonuses to many people rather than large ones to a few”, partially due to the fact
that they were unable to justify bonuses in organizations with “vague and complex goals”.
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to all officers by rotating them, even though it is disadvantageous in terms of having experts in a
particular area. This demonstrates that task assignments are not static in many agencies;
organizations may have reasons outside our model to want to keep task assignments in flux. This
could suggest that the efficiency cost of using our mechanism may not be too great. Finally,
government agencies “are often prepared to accept less money with greater control than more
money with less control,” according to Wilson (p. 179). “This is because of the high priority they
attach to autonomy, or turf.5” This mentality favors incentive mechanisms which rely on
operational control, like task assignments, instead of money.
On the other hand, our model is also potentially useful for corporations. If an
organization transitions from a period of rapid growth to being more “mature” and stable in size,
it may move from having lots of opportunity for promotion (and thus more traditional
tournament rewards) to having a much larger role played by task assignments. Similarly, an
organization that has money for bonuses or raises during good times may institute a pay freeze or
eliminate the bonus pool during a downturn, thus forcing the organization to rely on nonmonetary incentives. It is important to note that the model presented in this paper is not meant to
be an alternative to other tournament schemes, but rather, we model a distinct setting which
commonly arises in public organizations and may arise in other organizations as well.
The model developed here builds on the framework of Gilpatric, Vossler and Liu (2013),
which uses a dynamic Markov tournament to show that regulators benefit from placing firms in a
tournament where they compete to avoid being targeted for future audits. The theory and
supporting laboratory experiment demonstrate that the tournament setup achieves significant
leverage over a simple random audit mechanism6. The dynamic tournament model that the

5

Wilson states that political support is key for government bureaus and “ideally, a government bureau would like
to be the only organization in town curing cancer and would like to have no limitations on how it goes about
achieving that cure. The typical bureau is in a much less happy state of affairs… it must [operate] under the
watchful and critical eyes of countless subcommittees, interest groups, and journalists… all else being equal, big
budgets are better than small. But all else is not equal.” He goes on to cite many instances of government agencies
which have chosen smaller budgets and less responsibilities to maintain control over how to operate.
6
The authors’ theory involves firms bring placed in two groups: a high-probability audit group and a lowprobability audit group. Those in the targeted group compete to be transitioned to the non-targeted group, and
those in the non-targeted group compete to avoid being moved to the targeted group via an indefinite Markov
chain model. The regulator incorporates both peer-evaluation and the firm’s own compliance history to shape
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authors use is derived from the indefinite Markov chain models employed in the dynamic
regulatory enforcement literature (e.g. Landsberger and Meilijson, 1982; Greensberg, 1984;
Harrington, 1988; Harford and Harrington, 1991). We use a similar tournament framework, but
apply it to the labor market setting which has key differences, such as the need to satisfy agents’
participation constraint.
In our model, agents are either in favor or out of favor with the principal in any given
period. The organization is limited to two groups: the high group (in favor) and the low group
(out of favor). A tournament occurs within each group in each period. Agents are required to
complete contractible tasks and choose effort that increases output or performance in a noncontractible dimension. Non-contractible effort is unobservable to the principal. The agent(s)
with the highest output or performance in the low group in each period are subsequently
promoted to the high group, and the agent(s) with the lowest output in the high group in each
period are subsequently demoted to be in the low group. Agents are paid a fixed fee in each
period. The effort cost of completing assigned tasks in the contractible dimension is higher for
those agents in the low group if differential task assignment is employed as an incentive. The
prize of the tournament is the difference between groups in the present value of the agent’s
expected utility. Unlike other tournament models, in our model strong incentives arise from
competition for status within an organization without a significant hierarchy.
An important characteristic of our model employing differential task assignment to
reward high status is that in this setting more intense competition is desirable because it reduces
the difference in task assignments required to motivate any level of effort. Therefore an increase
in the variance of the random shocks that impact agents’ performance (which dulls the
competitive incentive) is costly to the principal. This finding lies in contrast to the standard
Lazear and Rosen (1981) tournament framework where greater variance in random shocks can
be offset by an increased prize spread to maintain the effort incentive at no cost to the principal
(assuming agents are risk neutral).

enforcement effort. Laboratory experiments broadly confirm the theoretical comparative statics: targeting leads to
significant enforcement leverage and the dynamic tournament exhibits strong audit cost, audit probability and
transition effects.
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The paper proceeds as follows. First, we present a dynamic Markov tournament model
with task incentives. Next, we compare this model to a general model of a dynamic Markov
tournament, demonstrating the inefficiency that results from the task model. Several propositions
follow. A discussion section concludes.

II.

A Dynamic Markov Tournament with Task Incentives

Our model consists of a firm or other organization whose objective is to maximize the
value of expected output net of labor costs. There are two dimensions of labor effort, one which
is contractible and one which is non-contractible. The contractible labor consists of tasks like
administrative work, classes which must be taught, or spots which must be filled in an assembly
line. The completion of these tasks is observable by the manager and verifiable by a third party
and, therefore, employees who do not fulfill the task requirements can be denied compensation.
Every period there are a certain number of contractible tasks that must be completed. On the
other hand, non-contractible effort cannot be directly observed by the manager or verified by a
third party. This effort contributes to the production of a valuable output, but just as in a standard
tournament model, the output is subject to random shocks. For example, a school principal must
ensure all classes are taught each semester. Simply being present and meeting certain basic
requirements of teaching is a contractible task. However, the output (student learning) also
depends on teacher effort in a manner that is non-contractible and the principal will therefore
desire to motivate this non-contractible effort. We model how the principal can use a dynamic
tournament to induce non-contractible effort from agents even if all agents receive equal
payment every period.
While the manager or principal seeks to maximize net benefit, he faces three constraints.
The first is that all of the contractible tasks must be completed, as mentioned above. Second, the
agents must agree to enter into the contract and thus participate in the tournament. Agents are
assumed to have an outside option and the present value of their expected utility from the
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tournament must be greater than their reservation utility. Third, it must be incentive compatible
for the agents to provide the level of non-contractible effort the principal seeks, which in our
context requires that the desired effort is the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the dynamic
tournament. In this section we will demonstrate that the manager can achieve this result when
high status can be rewarded with less required contractible effort. However, we will see later that
this method of incentivizing agents is costly and thus, the manager chooses to incentivize less
than optimal effort from agents.
risk-neutral7 agents who are sorted into two groups:

Our framework consists of

. The agents are better off when they are in favor with the manager (group

). The game is

infinite with discount factor . In each period, each agent chooses non-contractible effort
cost

, where

,

at

. The agent’s output from non-contractible effort is given by ,

which is the sum of effort and a random component:
i.i.d. draw from the distribution

and

(the random component is an

across agents and periods). Further, we utilize the following

additional notation:
fixed payment to an agent in a period, conditional on group assignment
number of agents in

and

number of agents in
and
selected for tournament (i.e. agents for
whom the manager will review their work in a given period)
probability of being selected for tournament (i.e. probability that the
agent’s work will be reviewed by the manager in a given period) for
agents in
and
number of agents in each period transitioned from
value of output

to

and vice versa

(common to both groups)

contractible effort required of each agent in

and

in each period

total contractible effort required to complete all necessary tasks in each
period such that
7

Both Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) discuss risk averse contestants. As with other
incentive mechanisms, risk aversion among agents implies only a second-best outcome can be achieved with a
tournament because motivating effort is traded-off against agents’ exposure to risk. This result applies in the
present context as well.
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cost of contractible effort for the agents, where

,

In each period, a separate tournament occurs in each group. Specifically,
from

agents

(in-favor group) are selected for tournament (i.e. the manager reviews their work; this

allows for the possibility that the manager may not be able to inspect the work of every agent in
every period) and the

agents with the lowest output are placed in
agents from

the following period,

while the other agents remain in

. Similarly,

selected for tournament and the

agents with the highest output are placed in

period, while the other agents remain in

(

and

(out-of-favor group) are
the following

). Agents choose non-

contractible effort before being selected for the tournament.
The manager can motivate agents using a spread of undesirable tasks between the high
(in favor) group and the low (out of favor) group. In this section, we assume that
and

. The manager must pay all agents the same fixed wage each period, but the manager

can assign tasks such that the prize of the tournament is the assignment of less contractible tasks.
Therefore, the payoff to an agent in

(in-favor group) in the task differentiation model is

, and analogously for an agent in
is higher than the payoff to agents in

. Thus, the payoff to agents in

. Let the probability that an agent in

for the tournament ranks among the bottom

who is selected

agents (and therefore gets transitioned to

represented by

and the probability that an agent in

ranks among the top

agents (and therefore gets transitioned to

) be

who is selected for tournament
) be represented by

. In each period, two tournaments take place; they differ in that the contest in the high
group is a competition to avoid ranking at the bottom while the contest in the low group is a
competition to rank at the top, but this is not consequential because the two tournaments are
otherwise completely symmetric. Both tournaments are standard symmetric rank-order
tournaments as developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).
Applying a result from Nalebuff and Stiglitz, the probability that an agent in
chooses effort

when the other agents in

choose

ranks in exactly the kth position up

from the bottom (e.g. k=1 denotes ranking last) is the following.
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who

∫

(

)

(

)
The probability that i ranks among the bottom

∑

is then

.

For identifying the symmetric equilibrium of the tournament, we require the marginal effect of
effort on the probability of ranking among the bottom

be evaluated when

. The

marginal effect on the probability of ranking in position k is given below.
∫

(

{

(

) {(

)

)

(

)

}

}

The effect of effort in symmetric equilibrium on the probability of ranking among the bottom
∑

then:
The

is

.

tournament is directly analogous except that effort increases the probability of an

agent’s ranking among the top

in the group. Because the random component of output is drawn

from the same distribution H regardless of group, it follows that
(

)

if

.

Agents are assumed to be risk neutral and maximize the expected present value of their
utility. The dynamic game follows a Markov chain process with a transition matrix representing
the probabilities for an agent to transition (or not transition) out of his current group. The matrix
is given in Table 2.1 in Appendix B. For example, the bottom middle cell represents the
probability that agent who is in
Let

in period will transition to

in period

.

be the expected present value to an agent of being in group 1 at time

analogously for group 2). Then we have:
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(and

(

)

The expected present value of utility is the sum of utility in the current period and the discounted
expected present value of utility starting from the next period, accounting for the probabilities
associated with the two possible states the agent may experience in the following period. The
agents maximize these expected present value utilities at any given point in time. Applying the
ergodic theorem for Markov chains, the optimal strategy for an agent is stationary, i.e.
conditioned only on an agent’s current state (group), not on the period in the game (Kohlas,
1982; Harrington, 1988). Stationarity allows us to drop the time subscript and we impose
symmetric behavior on all agents. Thus, we obtain the following first order conditions.

where:

(

(

)

(

))

This set of three equations implicitly defines the equilibrium of the dynamic game
entailing symmetric behavior by agents (all agents follow identical strategies conditional on their
group)8. Note than an agent maximizing his stage-game payoff would exert no effort in this
model. The equations above show the incentive arising from the dynamic game which depends
on the value of
agents in

. This difference is the prize at stake in both tournaments (among the

and among the agents in

), and the magnitude of the difference depends on two

things: the difference in contractible effort required, z
8

; and the equilibrium

The existence of pure strategy equilibrium in any rank order tournament requires sufficient variance of the
random component of agents’ output. This is required to make the equilibrium effort satisfy general incentive
compatibility such that the effort identified by the marginal optimality conditions is not dominated by “opting out”
of competition and choosing zero effort. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) discuss this detail. As is standard, we assume
this condition is met.
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transition probabilities, which determine the “stickiness” of the states (in or out of favor) 9. The
lower the transition probabilities, the more valuable it is to be in

(in-favor group) rather than

. This result was identified by Gilpatric, Vossler and Liu (2013).
Recall that the principal does not have monetary prizes or other means of rewarding the
agents in the “in-favor” group with the exception of task assignment. This situation is common in
public organizations such as schools or government agencies. Additionally, managers in other
sectors may have limitations on their ability to reward employees monetarily due to civil service
rules, union contracts, or other constraints. Nevertheless, most managers do have some sort of
discretion over how to allocate assignments among employees. In fact, task delegation is
commonly an important aspect of the manager’s responsibility. In our framework, the monetary
compensation is fixed and contractible task effort is allowed to vary between groups. The
manager can reward agents with high status by assigning them less undesirable tasks. We will
show that the manager or principal is able to induce non-contractible effort from agents using
contractible task assignment. Consequently, labor contracts that provide the manager flexibility
in contractible task assignments serve the purpose of motivating non-contractible effort in
addition to other benefits that flexibility may provide (e.g. the ability to adjust to a changing
environment). However, the use of task assignment as a motivational tool does cause an
efficiency loss compared to the general model.

2.1 Optimizing the Dynamic Tournament Labor Contract
The manager’s problem is to maximize profit from the agents’ effort subject to the
constraints; specifically, the profit is equal to the value of expected output minus total cost each
period. Recall that the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied if the desired effort is
incentivized by the tournament. Further, the participation constraint will be slack for agents in
9

The first order conditions defining effort in each group (equations 1 and 2) show that effort is increasing in
, which is effectively the prize spread. Also, we have
[
( )];
therefore, by looking at equation 3, we can see
increases with z
. The denominator of the
r.h.s. of (3) is clearly increasing with the number of players transitioned each period, , which therefore decreases
the prize spread
and reduces equilibrium effort.
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the high group when it holds for agents in the low group. We assume the outside option for an
agent yields constant utility per period of

. Then the relevant constraint is

present value of the equilibrium payoff stream for an agent in

, that is, the

(out-of-favor group) equals the

present value of the utility stream from opting out of the tournament. Therefore, the manager’s
problem is as follows.

The optimal non-contractible effort level, denoted

, is defined by

. Given

this, it is optimal to equate the effort incentive across groups which can be achieved by setting
and

, which also implies

. Optimal effort for agents in

, and analogously for agents in

will occur if

. Using equation 2, this is also:

. Rearranging, we get:

When agents in both groups choose a common effort level (here we are showing they both
choose the optimal effort), then

. We can now solve for the required

contractible effort spread that achieves optimal effort by substituting equation 3 into equation 4
and noting that

( )

( )

when

.

(

(

))

Now, we solve for the participation constraint, which will be slack for agents in the high
group when it holds for agents in the low group. The participation constraint is:
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This constraint shows that ensuring agents do not opt out of the tournament when they are out of
favor requires that the per-period fixed payment,

, be sufficient to compensate them for

foregoing their outside option and for the cost of contractible and non-contractible effort, less the
present value of expected future rents that the agent expects to obtain from future periods of
being in favor.
Finally, the total cost10 of compensation in each period is

. We can substitute

equation 6 into total cost to get:
{

}

We can rearrange equation 5 to get an expression for the last term in 7:

{

)}

(

Substituting this into the cost function, we have:

{

}
{

(

)}

In the limit, as discounting becomes negligible, we find that
{

}

10

Note that the “T” subscript on total cost is for “Task Model”; this is needed to differentiate from total cost in the
general model presented in the next section.
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The principal chooses a non-contractible effort level to induce, ̂ , and maximizes the
expected difference between total benefit and total cost. (Recall that output, , is the sum of noncontractible effort,

, and an error term, ; in expectation,

is simply

.) The principal’s

maximization problem is:
̂

̂

{

}

The first order condition yields:

̂

[

]
̂

Note that the average cost of contractible effort assigned increases as non-contractible effort
increases. That is:

]⁄

[

̂

. (In order to induce higher non-contractible effort from

agents, the principal must increase the spread between
completing these tasks to increase because

III.

and

.) This causes the average cost of
̂ .

. Thus,

Comparison to a General Dynamic Markov Tournament

In this section, we present a general model of a dynamic Markov tournament for
comparison purposes. In the general model, the manager can use monetary incentives to motivate
agents. We now assume that

. Further, we make the assumption that the manager evenly

distributes the contractible tasks among all
cost way for the manager to get all
due to

contractible tasks completed is to distribute them evenly

. Therefore, the payoff to an agent in
⁄

⁄ ). Note that the least-

agents (i.e.

(in-favor group) in the general model is

, and analogously for an agent in
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.

When agents in both groups choose a common effort level, then

.

For a given non-contractible effort level, , that the firm wishes to motivate, equation 5 from the
task model now becomes:
(

(

))

This is the fixed payoff spread that achieves optimal effort. Similarly, the participation constraint
for this model is also a function of contractible effort.
( )

This constraint shows that ensuring agents do not opt out of the tournament when they are out of
favor requires that the per-period fixed payoff

be sufficient to compensate them for forgoing

their outside option and for the cost of contractible and non-contractible effort, less the present
value of expected future rents that the agent expects to obtain from future periods of being in
favor.
Finally, we can find the total cost of compensation paid each period11, which is
. Substituting in equations 5b and 6b, we get:

( )
{

}
(

(

))

{

}

In the limit, as discounting becomes negligible, we find that
11

Note that the “G” subscript on total cost is for “General Model”; this is needed to differentiate from total cost in
the task model.
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{

( )}

The principal chooses a non-contractible effort level to induce, ̂ , and maximizes the expected
difference between total benefit and total cost12. (Recall that output,
contractible effort, , and an error term, ; in expectation,
we will show that the principal chooses to induce

is simply .) In the general model,

.

̂

̂

, is the sum of non-

{

̂

̂

The first order condition can be solved to show

( )}

; therefore, ̂

.

PROPOSITION 1: As discounting becomes negligible ( approaches 1) the general dynamic
tournament yields optimal effort,

, such that

.

3.1 Comparison of Models
Finally, we can compare the total cost from the general model to the total cost from the
task model. Due to
⁄

and

, [
. Thus, [

]⁄
⁄ ]

[

⁄ ]. Recall that
[ ⁄ ] and:

( )

12

This could be approached in different ways; for instance, by considering a dynamic Markov tournament
employed by competitive firms, analogous to the analysis of Lazear and Rosen (1981). In that case, competition for
labor bids up agents’ payoffs until the value of expected output equals costs each period. Note that in this case the
participation constraint does not bind; rather, the fixed payments must maximize agents’ present value expected
utility subject to the zero profit constraint. Of course the expected utility of agents differs depending on their
group, but as δ approaches 1 the solutions converge. Alternatively, we can suppose that the first-period fixed
payoff to agents randomly placed in G1 is
in order to equate the expected utility of agents across
groups at the start of the game. In this case the same , pair maximize both and the present value of
expected utility for agents in G1 at the start of the game. In any case, the result is the same.
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Therefore,

. Intuitively, the manager in the task differentiation model faces a tradeoff

between implementing the appropriate incentives to induce optimal non-contractible effort and
obtaining completion of the contractible tasks at least cost.
Recall that the principal chooses a non-contractible effort level to induce,

̂ , and

maximizes the expected difference between total benefit and total cost. Further recall from the
general model that the principal chooses to induce

. The principal maximizes:

̂

̂

{

̂
̂

The first order condition can be solved to show

( )}
̂

; therefore,

. In the task

differentiation model, on the other hand, the principal’s maximization problem is:
̂

̂

{

̂

}

The first order condition yields:

̂

[

]
̂

Note that the average cost of contractible effort assigned increases as non-contractible effort
increases, that is,

[

]⁄
̂

. In order to induce higher non-contractible effort from

agents, the principal must increase the spread between

and

. This causes the average cost of

. We can conclude that ̂

completing these tasks to increase because

̂ , or

̂ .

Constrained by the lack of monetary incentives, the principal chooses to induce less noncontractible effort in the task differentiation model because he faces an additional cost of
increasing the payoff spread.
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PROPOSITION 2: When monetary incentives are not available, the manager can use the
assignment of tasks to motivate optimal effort. However, an inefficiency is created: noncontractible effort will be less than

, i.e. the effort incentivized is “second-best”.

IV. Extensions

4.1 Error Variance
An important result of Lazear and Rosen (1981) is that the prize spread required for a
given effort level,

̂ , increases with the error variance. In the Lazear and Rosen (1981)

framework, and in the general dynamic tournament model presented here, increasing the spread
of payoffs is not costly (i.e. the tournament manager does not need to pay extra compensation to
agents as a result of increasing

, holding total payment,

in the task differentiation model, increasing the spread between

, constant). However,
and

is costly due to

the convexity of the cost of contractible effort function and causes inefficiency. O’Keeffe,
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984) argue that the error variance in a tournament can reflect a variety
of phenomena such as uncertainty in environmental factors or the precision with which a
principal monitors his agents. If it is the case that monitoring precision partially explains the
error, then in the task differentiation model, the manager’s ability to precisely evaluate his
employees is important for efficiency13. This result is in contrast to the standard tournament
literature.

13

Note that the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in any rank order tournament requires sufficient variance of
the random component of agents’ output. This is required to make the equilibrium effort satisfy general incentive
compatibility such that the effort identified by the marginal optimality conditions is not dominated by “opting out”
of competition and choosing zero effort. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) discuss this detail. As is standard, we assume
this condition is met.
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PROPOSITION 3: In the task differentiation model, an increase in the variance of
the spread of payoffs,

increases

, required to motivate any effort level. This is costly for the

principal and decreases the elicited effort,

̂.

The task model we present suggests that constraining managers to use non-monetary
incentives is sub-optimal. Thus, an inefficiency is created in many public organizations, such as
government agencies and schools. However, this inefficiency may not be as bad as it seems.
Inefficiency in tournament settings is common in other circumstances as well. A different line of
literature which examines “limited liability” in tournaments (e.g. Krakel and Schottner, 2012)
has a similar effect in terms of error variance, but for a different reason. Under limited liability,
increasing the prize spread is costly because workers cannot earn negative payoffs; consequently,
the prize for the loser is bounded at zero. Increasing the prize spread beyond this point causes the
total prize payout to increase. Thus, an increase in the error variance – which requires an increase
in the prize spread to maintain a given effort level – results in inefficiency. As previously stated,
this result parallels our findings, but the source of the inefficiency differs. In our model, prizes
are not bounded, but the cost of contractible effort is a convex function. Therefore, the
inefficiency results from not assigning the contractible tasks evenly among the employees.

4.2 Transition Probability
Similarly to the error variance, the number of agents transitioned between groups in each
period, , also has an effect on the manager’s cost. Recall equation 3:

(
It is easy to see that increasing

(

)

(

))

decreases the spread in the present value of utility,

,

ceteris paribus, and thus decreases equilibrium effort. In order to maintain a given effort level, ̂ ,
the manager will have to increase the spread of the fixed payoffs,
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(or

).

In the general base model, increasing the spread of payoffs has no consequence in terms of the
cost to the manager. In the task differentiation model, however, increasing

is

costly and increases the inefficiency of the model. Therefore, it is optimal for the manager to
keep the number of agents transitioned as small as possible.

PROPOSITION 4: In the task differentiation model, the optimal number of agents transitioned
from

V.

to

and vice versa is

.

Conclusion

Tournaments are frequently used to model labor market settings due to the hierarchal
nature of employment; typically, there is a clear potential for promotion and, sometimes,
demotion. We demonstrate that a tournament can also be used in non-hierarchal situations where
many employees are at a similar rank, promotion does not play a significant role in employees’
motivation, and immediate monetary incentives are not readily available (e.g. employees in a
government agency, teachers in a public school or associate professors in a university). While the
manager in such an organization may not be able to set up a monetary incentive program, he can
still induce optimal non-contractible effort by appropriately assigning contractible tasks. The
payoff spread is determined by the difference in contractible tasks for in-favor employees and
out-of-favor employees. Thus, the prize spread is the difference (between the in-favor group and
the out-of-favor group) in the present value of the employees’ expected utility. However, it is
more costly to the manager to induce optimal effort in this framework compared to a tournament
with monetary incentives. Therefore, suboptimal effort results and the solution is “second-best”.
Since increasing the payoff spread is costly in this task differentiation model, an increase
in the error variance or an increase in the number of agents transitioned between groups
contributes to the inefficiency. In both cases, the incentives underlying the tournament are
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dulled, requiring the manager to increase the payoff spread to maintain a given effort level. A
different line of literature which examines “limited liability” in tournaments (e.g. Krakel and
Schottner, 2012) has a similar effect in terms of error variance, but for a different reason. As
previously stated, this puts our model’s inefficiency into context; inefficiencies can arise for
other reasons and thus, the task delegation setup we present is not necessarily a worse situation
than using monetary incentives.
A possible extension involves different values of output between the two groups. For
example, a principal may value non-contractible effort from teachers more highly in honors
classes (a possible task “reward” for the in-favor group) because the parents of honors students
are more demanding, or he may value non-contractible effort more highly in lower-level classes
(a possible task “punishment” for the out-of-favor group) due minimum standard testing that the
school must pass14. Regardless of which output is valued more highly (that of the in-favor agents
or the out-of-favor agents), the model can be solved to show that the manager will induce
different levels of non-contractible effort to reflect the difference in output values. In the general
model, the manager will induce effort exactly such that the marginal cost of effort in each group
is equal to the value of output for each group. In the task model, on the other hand, the noncontractible effort induced will depend on several factors, including the proportion of agents who
are selected for tournament in each period. This suggests that the manager can influence the
effort induced to appropriately reflect output values by varying the intensity with which he
evaluates agents in each group. This extension is plausible in that it reflects a problem that
managers are likely to face and further work in this area could lead to interesting results.
Our framework has important roots in the literature on public organizations. Several
papers have noted that monetary incentives are rarely used in the public sector in comparison to
the private sector. This may be partially due to the fact that there are insufficient funds for large
bonuses and partially due to the unpopularity of rewarding employees in public service with cash
payments (Heinrich and Marschke 2010). Further, it is often the nature of public service,

14

Similarly, in a government organization, the manager could place a high value on non-contractible effort put into
a report that gets publicized even if this report is tedious to produce and is therefore the task “punishment” for
the out-of-favor group.
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especially in the case of education, that the hierarchy of the organization is fairly flat, at least for
certain groups of employees. This does not mean, however, that managers have no opportunities
to incentivize employees using a tournament. On the contrary, managers are frequently
responsible for assigning courses, administrative tasks and other contractible responsibilities.
While some programs may be very transparent, such as an “employee of the month” scheme,
most of the managers’ decisions are probably based on which employees are “in favor” and
which employees are “out of favor” in the current time period. Further, employees are likely to
fall out of favor, or be “promoted” to being in favor, with the manager from time to time based
on past performance. A dynamic Markov tournament is therefore a mechanism that may enable
an organization without explicit performance incentives or hierarchy to achieve efficient labor
outcomes.
Further, our model offers a new perspective on the value to managers of flexibility over
job assignments. Of course flexibility is important for a firm or any organization in that it allows
adaptation to changing technology or market conditions without having to re-negotiate labor
contracts15. However, we show that there may be an additional advantage of flexibility in that it
can be used as an incentive mechanism. A manager who can use contractible task assignments to
reward agents in favor and punish those out of favor has the opportunity to motivate noncontractible effort by engaging employees in a competitive tournament for status.

15

Wright and Snell (1998) note that flexibility in workforce can be important for a firm’s ability to meet the needs
of a dynamic environment.
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Appendix A
Theoretical Work
Proof of Proposition 1:
The optimization problem is given in (8’)
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Proof of Proposition 2:
The firm’s optimization problem is:
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The first order condition yields:
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In order to induce higher non-contractible effort from agents, the principal must increase the
spread between and ; this causes the average cost of contractible effort to increase because
. Thus, [
]⁄ ̂
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Proof of Proposition 3:
Recall that
is the probability that an agent in
among the top agents and therefore gets transitioned to
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When the error variance increases, then
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decreases. Recall equation 5:
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As the denominator of this equation decreases, the prize spread,
achieve any effort level increases.

, required to

Proof of Proposition 4:
The difference in expected utilities,
Recall equation 3:

(
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)

(

, is the effective prize spread of the tournament.
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⁄
Clearly,
. An increase in the prize spread required for a given effort level
further requires an increase in the payoff spread,
. Recall the total cost in the task
differentiation model:
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and the manager is best off minimizing .
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Appendix B
Tables
Table 2.1: Transition Probabilities
From Group ↓

To Group →

G1

G1
G2
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CHAPTER 3
Willingness to Pay for Goods with Unregulated and Potentially
Misleading Labels: the Case of “Natural”-Labelled Groceries
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Abstract

Food labeling has been widely studied, especially in the context of consumer willingness to pay
for features that are considered healthy, such as organic content. In this study, we provide insight
to the demand effects for an unregulated phrase found on many labels: “natural”. A plethora of
currently pending lawsuits regarding this phrase demonstrates that research is needed to better
understand consumer misconceptions. In an experimental setting, we use an incentivecompatible approach to elicit the willingness to pay of grocery shoppers for “natural”-labelled
food products, several of which contain genetically modified organisms (GMOs). We find, on
average, that there is an overall null effect of the “natural” label. However, when the sample is
segregated based on the belief that “natural” means GMO-free, there is a positive “natural”
premium for those who hold the belief and a negative premium for those who do not hold the
belief. Additionally, we find evidence of framing effects which suggest that between-subject
analysis is more reliable for this type of research than within-subject analysis. Our results have
implications in both the public policy and legal arenas.
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I.

Introduction

The phrases “all natural”, “natural”, “100% natural”, etc. have been under fire recently.
Consumers claim that the phrases are misleading when the associated products contain artificial
ingredients, preservatives, and/or genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many lawsuits have
been considered and several are currently pending1. These lawsuits have included popular
products such as Wesson cooking oil, Campbell’s soup, Kix cereal, Truvia sweetener, SunChips,
Tostitos chips, Goldfish crackers, Ben and Jerry’s ice cream, Naked juice and many others.
Although several judges have asked the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to officially define
and regulate the phrases (Frankel 2013), the FDA has prioritized other projects, leaving the
decision of whether to award damages to the courts. In a recent email to USA Today, the FDA
stated, “Defining ‘natural’ represents additional challenges when food has been processed and is
no longer the product of the earth. Additionally, there are differing perspectives on how specific
such a label should be” (Weise 2014). The FDA initially decided not to define the phrase in the
1990s; since then, manufacturers have been able to use the phrase free of any regulation 2.
However, recent turmoil has caused some manufacturers to remove the “natural” label from their
products3. In particular, the issue of GMOs in food labelled as “natural” has received intense

1

Several lawsuits have been dismissed by judges and others have been settled out of court; so far, none have gone
to trial, but there are still many cases waiting “in the pipeline” (Smith 2014). In addition to lawsuits specifically
regarding the “natural” label (see Allen et al. 2013, Frankel 2013, and Smith 2014), there are a plethora of GMO
labelling lawsuits, some of which also address “natural”; as of July 2013, 37 GMO labeling cases had been
introduced in 21 U.S. states and several legislators had introduced a new potential federal law called the
“Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act”, which, if passed, would require the labeling of all GM foods (see
the Center for Food Safety and Cummins 2014).
2
Although the “natural” term is not actively regulated, the FDA has occasionally sent warning letters to
manufacturers who used a clearly synthetic ingredient in their “natural” product. However, these letters often go
ignored according to a report by The Center for Science in the Public Interest (Silverglade and Heller 2010). The
same report explicitly points out many natural claims that may be considered “deceptive” but have been allowed
to remain the marketplace.
3
In 2009, 30% of food products and 45% of beverages introduced in the U.S. were reportedly labelled “natural”; in
2013, only 22% of food products and 34% of beverages held the label (Smith 2014).
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media coverage as the U.S. remains one of the only developed countries to not specifically
require GMO labelling4.
To help inform the legal and policy debates, this study uses economics experiments with
seasoned grocery shopper participants to determine whether and why there are demand effects
generated by the use of “natural” labels. Using an incentive-compatible approach to elicit
willingness to pay (WTP) for several grocery items with and without “natural” labels, we find
that consumers who believe “natural” means “no genetically modified organisms” (42% of our
sample) are willing to pay a premium for “natural” food, whereas consumers who do not have
this belief actually exhibit a negative premium. The overall effect is near zero, although the
identified heterogeneity suggests that “natural” labels are potentially misleading and further that
there is potential for firms to exploit uninformed consumers.
Food labeling has been widely studied, especially in the context of consumer WTP for
features that are considered healthy, such as organic certification. Additionally, most labels are
highly regulated by the government; for instance, the phrase “low fat” cannot be used for foods
with more than 3 grams of fat per serving (serving sizes are also regulated). Especially for labels
indicating low environmental impact, most of the theoretical literature acknowledges that there is
some level of fraud in the market for regulated labels, but the effects of an unregulated phrase on
consumer demand are unclear empirically. Importantly, food labeling has increasingly become
an environmental issue rather than simply a consumer health preference issue, especially in the
case of genetically modified ingredients.
Due to pressure from activists and the media, many European retailers have decided not
to carry GMO-containing foods. Conversely, GMOs are widely used in the U.S. One estimate by
the Center for Food Safety indicated that possibly more than 70% of processed foods in U.S.
supermarkets contain GMOs – specifically 85% of corn and 91% of soybeans, which are both
very common ingredients in processed foods. While some consumers and organizations are
concerned about GMOs in food, others are more optimistic. GM foods have the potential to
reduce costs and reduce the need for chemical pesticides. Cost reductions could allow a
4

According the Center for Food Safety, 64 countries have mandatory labeling of GM foods; the U.S. is one of the
few remaining developed countries without GM label regulations.
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considerable increase in food production, helping poor countries to address hunger concerns.
Further, genetic enhancement technology for plants and animals may be able to create healthier
versions of food with added vitamins and less saturated fat. The U.S. FDA states that GM foods
are, in general, just “as nutritious as foods from comparable traditionally bred plants”. On the
other hand, the Center for Food Safety (a non-profit organization) advocates for GM food
labeling laws. In addition, the environmental effects of GMOs are largely unknown. Introduction
of these new species into existing ecosystems could potentially cause irreversible damage.
Regulating the location and spread of these species could be very costly, if not impossible.
As awareness and demand for GMO-free products begins to heat up the U.S., research is
needed to determine how U.S. consumers respond to GM ingredients. In particular, research
regarding GMOs and the “natural” label is, to our knowledge, non-existent; yet, the plethora of
pending lawsuits demonstrates that the issue requires attention. The Center for Science in the
Public Interest urged the FDA and USDA to define “natural” and strictly enforce standards,
while others feel that the natural label should be eliminated altogether, especially since the term
“organic” is highly regulated and already serves the purpose of signaling fresh, non-GMO
products to consumers (Plumer 2014). Existing literature largely focuses on the European Union,
where the debate over GM food started more than a decade ago. Prior work has also focused
specifically on willingness to pay for food with GM-specific labels5. This paper differs in several
important ways.
We present an experimental elicitation of willingness to pay for food with and without
“natural” labels. Our hybrid approach answers two main questions: a survey addresses consumer
beliefs surrounding the phrase “natural” (e.g. Do consumers believe that the foods labeled as
“natural” contain GM ingredients?) and an auction-style experiment elicits willingness to pay for
“natural” food. Further, we explore other dimensions, such as beliefs surrounding health and
5

Lusk et al. (2005) provide a useful meta-analysis of 25 GM food valuation studies that report a total of 57
valuations for GM food. They find that, on average, consumers place a 23% premium on non-GM food. Notably,
European consumers placed a significantly higher premium on GM food than U.S. consumers, and studies that
used student samples yielded similar estimates to those that used non-students. The authors also found that
hypothetical surveys yielded higher premiums that non-hypothetical studies, studies using a willingness to accept
measure had higher premiums than those using a willingness to pay measure, and GM oil products were more
acceptable to consumers than GM meat products. Further, GM products that provided enhanced nutrition
compared to their non-GM counterparts significantly decreased the premiums associated with non-GM food.
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environmental risks associated with GMOs. The proper counterfactual for the natural label is
unclear given the current literature so we additionally include two baseline treatments. Finally,
we explore how the WTP for the “natural” label differs on several dimensions, including whether
the product is used in cooking or is consumed as is, whether the product is edible or simply used
as a toiletry (e.g. toothpaste), and whether the product is typically given to children. In total, we
use six product pairs, where one product in the pair is “natural” and the other product in the pair
is not advertised as such.
Our procedures closely follow Huffman et al. (2003)6. Adults (age 18 and older) were
paid to participate in a survey (including questions on demographics, beliefs regarding “natural”
label regulation, and opinions of GMOs) and an incentive-compatible purchase procedure for
several food items. Each “natural”-labelled food item had a “non-natural” counterpart. Although
the brands were different, the products were almost identical; therefore, the generic labels
presented to the participants were identical except for the “natural” indication. The BeckerDeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964) was used to elicit WTP for each
variety7. Additional details on recruiting and procedures are provided later.
This design allowed us to explore how factors such as natural flavors and colors, GMO
content, and the mere existence of the “meaningless” label, can be attributed to a potential price
premium for “natural” food. It is possible that some consumers are aware that the phrase
“natural” is not regulated, but are still willing to pay a premium for foods with “natural” labels
because the label signals a higher likelihood of attempted health or environmental safety concern
by the manufacturer. This last point is documented in the eco-label literature by Cason and
Gangadharan (2002). These authors show that, in a laboratory setting, “cheap talk” by
6

Several papers by Huffman et al. (Huffman 2003; Huffman, Rousu, Shogren, and Tegene 2003; Huffman and
Tegene 2002) used an experiment to elicit willingness to pay for GM foods under various information conditions.
Participants bid on three food items: vegetable oil, tortilla chips and russet potatoes. The food labels were generic
and only included information on the weight of the package, the expiration date, and the GM content depending
on treatment. Participants were also given information on GM foods (including general information and scientific,
human, financial and environmental impacts) from a variety of sources. As expected, the authors find that the antiGM perspective increases the WTP gap between GM and non-GM foods, the pro-GM perspective decreases the
WTP gap between GM and non-GM foods, and the third-party information acts as a moderator when provided in
addition to the other sources. Overall, WTP for GM-labeled food was 14% less than food with a plain label.
7
Huffman et al. actually use an nth-price auction to elicit WTP rather than the BDM mechanism. The techniques
are similar and the BDM approach is used by Noussair et al. (2004). The details are discussed in design section.
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manufacturers regarding product quality is not enough to maintain an efficient outcome, but it is
enough for the manufacturers to command a price premium for their inferior, fraudulentlylabeled products. This is due to the fact that the majority of the quality claims in the market are
true; thus, consumers are willing to pay a premium even under uncertainty.
Noussair et al. (2004) conducted a similar study regarding GMOs. These authors allowed
participants in France to taste-test several varieties of biscuits before sequentially revealing
information regarding GM content, information on GMOs in general, and finally, the brand
names of the biscuits. The authors used a thorough training process to explain the purchase
procedure: they allowed subjects to discuss the optimal bidding strategy and transitioned subjects
to the purchase procedure using both induced value and real-product training rounds8. The results
indicated that many participants were willing to purchase the GM varieties if the prices were
sufficiently low. This is a surprise given that French surveys indicated an overwhelming
opposition to GM foods; at the time, opposition to GM foods was very high in European
countries9.
Our study differs in that it focuses on a potentially misleading label, not GM content per
se. In the U.S., the lack of regulation regarding informative labels is the emphasis of recent
lawsuits. Therefore, we are analyzing consumer knowledge and perception of foods and labels as
well as price premiums that may be associated with different interpretations of the phrase
“natural”. Primarily, we find that consumers who believe that “natural” means “no genetically
modified organisms” are willing to pay a premium for “natural” food, whereas consumers who
do not explicitly report this belief actually exhibit a negative premium. This result holds for a
variety of different products. Further, explicitly pointing out the lack of a “natural” label for
standard products significantly affects the premium; transparency could be important from a
marketing standpoint. Finally, we find evidence of framing effects which suggest that between-

8

We use the same incentive-compatible purchase procedure and use similar training exercises.
Further, the 1% GM content threshold was treated differently than the 0.1% threshold, and the 0.1% threshold
was treated differently from GM-free. The information revelation raised the price of the GM-free product; it also
raised the prices of some of the GM-containing products, but not enough to overcome the drop in price from when
GM content was revealed. Finally, revealing the brand names of the products raised prices for most of the
products.
9
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subject analysis is more reliable for this type of research than within-subject analysis. Section II
outlines our experimental design, Section III presents the results and Section IV concludes.

II.

Experimental Design

The design includes two equally important parts: a purchase procedure and a survey. We
used the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964) to sell 12 grocery
products (6 product pairs) to 164 adult grocery shoppers in Knoxville, TN. Each product pair
included a “natural”-labelled version and a standard version (a product that does not say
“natural” on the label). The two versions were not the same brand, but were otherwise very
similar. We used an eclectic variety of products to broaden the scope of our results: potato chips,
peanut butter, crackers, cooking oil, cereal and toothpaste. Subjects viewed generic labels of the
products and placed bids. The generic labels were identical except the natural version said
“natural”, “all-natural”, or “100% natural”, depending on how the actual natural product was
advertised. Prior to bidding, subjects participated in several training exercises to familiarize them
with the BDM. After bidding, the subjects filled out a survey which elicited demographic
information and beliefs and opinions regarding the “natural” label and GMOs. Table 3.1 depicts
the sequence of events for each session. In total, 8 sessions were conducted at the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville Experimental Laboratory in June 2014.
Our treatments varied on two dimensions. First and foremost, we (randomly) assigned
subjects to see either the natural labels or the standard labels first. Subjects bid in two blocks:
Part 1 and Part 2. Half the subjects saw natural labels in Part 1 and standard labels in Part 2, and
the other half saw standard labels in Part 1 and natural labels in Part 2. We also randomized the
order of the six products within each Part. Secondly, we varied whether we explicitly told
subjects that the standard products were not advertised as natural. This provided two baselines:
standard labels without any explanation and (the same) standard labels, accompanied by a
statement that indicated the associated products do not say “natural” on the labels. The existing
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literature does not provide clear guidance on which baseline is appropriate for our situation,
which is why we include both. We discuss this in detail later.

2.1 Purchase Procedure
The purchase procedure we used was the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism
(Becker et al., 1964). Similar to a second-price auction, the dominant strategy for subjects is to
bid their maximum willingness to pay for the item being sold, regardless of risk preference.
Unlike an auction, however, there can be multiple winners, thus decreasing the potential for nondemand revealing bids due to competition considerations10. In short, subjects place a bid for the
item for sale. Next, a random price is determined by rolling dice. The distribution of prices is
uniform over a predetermined interval11. For instance, we used an interval of $0.00 - $5.99 for
our main experiment; to achieve any price within the interval with equal probability, we asked a
volunteer to roll a six-sided die with numbers 0-5 for the dollars, and then roll a ten-sided die
with numbers 0-9 twice (once for each cents place)12.
Participants were not aware of the interval when placing their bids. Instead, they were
told that the interval would be capped at the maximum expected willingness to pay based on
previous research. We pre-determined the intervals based on the retail prices of the products and
the results from our pilot session. Finally, the participants’ bids were compared to the random
price. If a participant’s bid was higher than or equal to the random price, they purchased the item

10

Noussair et al. (2004) also use this procedure. All participants have a positive probability of winning; thus, the
frequency of insincere bidding is reduced.
11
We considered programming our experiment using zTree software, as is typical for many experiments. However,
we decided to use a traditional pen-and-paper setting, rather than a computerized mechanism. Participants were
instructed to simply write their bids on paper. We asked for a volunteer to determine the sale prices by rolling
dice. Given that the subjects were not college students, and therefore unfamiliar with the computerized laboratory
setting, we believe that the transparency of the randomization process was important. While this pen-and-paper
setting required additional data input time, the experiment was simple enough that the benefits of transparency
outweighed the costs of data entry.
12
For the training rounds, we used different intervals (e.g. $1.00 - $4.99 for a training round where the good for
sale was $3.00). We used a polyhedral dice set (which includes dice with a variety of sides and numbers) to achieve
the intervals we needed. Participants were told that the intervals would not all be the same. Further, they were
made aware of the interval used for the round only after they placed their bids for the round.
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and paid the random price. If a participant’s bid was lower than the random price, they did not
purchase the item and did not pay anything.

2.2 Training
Subjects participated in several training exercises prior to the actual experiment. The
purpose of the training was to ensure that subjects understood the best bidding strategy for the
BDM. Prior work has differed on how to train subjects; some experimenters tell subjects the best
strategy and explain it using examples (e.g. Plott and Zeiler 2005), while others provide a series
of induced value rounds and let subjects figure out and discuss the strategy on their own (e.g.
Noussair et al. 2004). We used a hybrid approach. First, we described the purchase procedure to
the subjects and had them answer a set of practice example problems, assuming that the item for
sale is a $5.00 bill (e.g. “Suppose you bid $3.20 and the random price determined by the
volunteer is $4.50. Would you purchase the $5.00 bill? If so, what price would you pay?”). They
were paid for correct answers. Subsequently, we discussed the optimal strategy with the
participants and allowed them to ask questions.
Next, we implemented two training rounds where the item for sale was an amount of
money ($7.00 and $3.00). For each of these training rounds, subjects placed a bid and then we
played out the purchase procedure (rolling the dice and determining earnings) several times to
allow for learning situations (random prices above and below the value of the sale item) and to
allow the subjects to earn cash. For instance, if a subject bid $6.90 in the first training round and
the random price for the first trial was $5.60, then the subject earned $1.40 for that trial ($7.00 $5.60). Rarely, subjects earned negative money for a trial if they bid higher than the value of the
item. Most subjects bid exactly $3.00 (the optimal bid) or within 10% of $3.00 by the time we
got to the second training round13.

13

As further proof (although possibly biased proof) that subjects understood the instructions, more than 90% of
subjects responded “4” or “5” to the question, “Did you understand the instructions for the experiment today?
Please rate your understanding on a scale from 1 to 5” where “5” was “I understood very well”.
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Finally, as the last part of the training, we sold an actual grocery item. The purpose of this
training round was to allow subjects to see that they actually receive the items they purchase (we
physically handed them the item if they purchased it) and to allow them to see that the optimal
strategy is the same, regardless of whether the item for sale is an amount of money or a grocery
product. There is precedent for the importance of this type of training in the literature: Noussair
et al. (2004) use both induced value rounds and a training round with an actual product. In our
experiment, we instructed the subjects to choose beforehand whether they would like to bid on a
Snickers bar or a granola bar14. They placed their bids and then a random price was determined
by rolling dice from a predetermined price interval. We immediately distributed the items to the
subjects who purchased. Subjects were told ahead of time that any purchases they made would
be subtracted from their earnings. We have no interest in the bids for this round in terms of our
research question; this round was used purely as a training exercise.

2.3 Procedures, Products and Labels
After the training, we proceeded to the actual experiment where subjects placed bids on
the grocery items. We used a total of 12 grocery items: a natural-labelled variety and a standard
variety (without a natural label) for each of six products: canola cooking oil, kettle-cooked potato
chips, creamy peanut butter, frosted bite-size wheat cereal, wheat crackers, and mint-flavored
toothpaste. We used an eclectic set of products for several reasons. First, we wanted to use a
product that is currently under lawsuit for using the “natural” label; Wesson cooking oil fits this
requirement. Additionally, several varieties of chips have been involved in lawsuits in the past.
Second, we wanted to use a non-edible product and the toothpaste fits this requirement.
Third, we wanted to include a product that is typically given to children; both the peanut
butter and the frosted bite-size wheat cereal could fall under this condition. According to a report
by The Center for Science in the Public Interest (Silverglade and Heller 2010), “products
claiming to be natural, particularly those aimed at parents of young children, have a competitive
14

The granola bars were gluten-free and nut free. This provided an option for participants with popular dietary
restrictions.
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edge in the marketplace”. We hypothesize that the natural premium for products typically given
to children may be different from the premium for other products – we also asked about the
number of children in the household in our survey. Fourth, we thought it was important to have
products that could be consumed immediately or soon after the experiment concluded (as
opposed to products that are used in cooking, like cooking oil). The potato chips and the wheat
crackers fit this need.
Fifth, and possibly most importantly, it was necessary to have some products that
typically contain genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Although the subjects did not know
whether the particular product in our experiment contained GMOs, they may have had some
knowledge regarding whether the type of product has been associated with GMOs. Major brands
of cooking oil, potato chips and wheat crackers have all been publicly associated with GMOs.
For instance, several organizations publish lists to guide consumers on how to eat “non-GMO”.
Lays potato chips (all varieties), Ruffles potato chips (all varieties), and Ritz crackers are some
of the brand names on the “do not buy” list.
Subjects placed bids in two Parts: a “natural” Part and a “standard” Part15. We
randomized which Part came first. Also, the order of products was randomized within each Part.
This design allows us to examine both between- and within-subject effects. For the initial
between-subject analyses, we only use the Part 1 bids (for half of the subjects, this is the natural
products and for the other half this is the standard products). Subjects were informed that one
round would be randomly chosen from each Part to be binding, but that the binding rounds
would not be determined until after all bids had been placed. A volunteer rolled a six-sided die to
determine the binding rounds at the end of the experiment. The random prices were then
determined (also via a volunteer rolling dice) only for the binding rounds. After filling out the
survey, subjects were paid in cash (in private) and were given the goods (if any) that they
purchased. The bid packets and surveys were matched only by ID number to preserve
anonymity.

15

We did not use these “natural” and “standard” names in the experiment, but we use them here to refer to labels
with “natural” and labels without “natural”.
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The labels for the products were generic and included information such as the type of
product, the size, the flavor, etc. We chose pairs of products that were almost identical except for
the natural label. For instance, both the natural and standard versions of the peanut butter were
“creamy”, were 16 ounce containers, and had 0 grams trans-fat per serving. Both the natural and
standard versions of the toothpaste were “clean mint” flavor, were American Dental Association
Accepted, contained fluoride, were labelled “whitening”, and were approximately 4 ounce
tubes16. The generic labels for both products in each pair were identical with the exception of the
natural version saying “natural”. In other words, if there was a slight difference on the labels of
the two products, we did not include that difference on the generic label17. Please refer to Figures
3.1 and 3.2 in Appendix B for examples of our labels and pictures of the actual products used.
(Note that participants only viewed the generic labels when bidding, not the actual products.)
Participants were informed that all of the information on the generic labels was completely
accurate to the actual product label.
Finally, we also included potential brand names on our labels (this was identical for both
the natural and standard labels). We did this to help the subjects to understand which type of
product was for sale (e.g. a “wheat cracker” could take various forms, but most people know
what type of product to picture when they are informed that the product is similar to a Ritz
cracker). The brands listed were not necessarily the brands of the actual products, but all of the
actual products were major brands (not store brands).
It is unclear what the proper counterfactual is for the “natural” label. To the best of our
knowledge, there are no existing products that say “Unnatural” or “Not Natural” on their labels.
Therefore, our standard labels simply did not say anything about natural. However, this does not
necessarily mean that the product is not “natural” in the sense that it may or may not reflect the
16

We were able to find some of the product pairs in the exact same size containers. However, if the containers
were similar, but not exactly the same, we included approximate sizes on the generic label. We always used an
approximate size that was smaller than or equal to the size of the actual product. This way, participants would
never pay more than they intended for a product, given its size.
17
For instance, the natural crackers said “Entertainment” on the actual product label, but the standard variety did
not say “Entertainment”; even though the two products are extremely similar, the brand we chose for the
standard variety did not advertise their product as a party cracker, or a cracker typically used “for entertaining”.
Thus, we simply did not include this detail on our generic labels; our labels were identical with the exception of
“natural” on the natural variety.
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beliefs that subjects have regarding the natural label. For instance, a product that is not labelled
“natural” doesn’t necessarily contain artificial flavors or colors. (Many of our subjects indicated
in the survey that they believe “natural” means “no artificial flavors” and “no artificial colors”).
Therefore, we included additional treatments in which we explicitly informed subjects that the
products included in a particular Part do not say “natural” on their labels18.
The literature does not provide clear guidance on this issue. Huffman et al. (2003)
examine labels which indicate that a product does or does not contain GMOs (i.e. “This product
contains GMOs” or “This product does not contain GMOs” or no statement regarding GMOs.).
However, regulations regarding this type of labelling (“This product contains GMOs”) exist in
Europe and are under consideration in some states in the U.S. Conversely, it seems highly
unlikely that a regulation will ever exist which requires manufacturers to state “This product is
not natural”, especially since the label is completely unregulated now19. Therefore, we
implement what we call “explicit” and “implied” treatments so that we can use both
counterfactuals. In the “explicit” treatments, a piece of paper with subject-specific instructions
informed subjects that the products which followed did not say “natural” on the actual labels. In
the “implied” treatments, the subjects just viewed the standard labels without any indication of
whether or not the actual products were “natural”.
This allowed us to vary the transparency that subjects face. In reality, this level of
transparency varies at grocery stores. For instance, in the case of cooking oil, both the “natural”labeled variety and the variety without a “natural” label literally sit adjacent to one another on
the shelf in most major grocery stores – it is very obvious that a “natural” variety exists. On the
other hand, we had to go to two different stores to find “natural” and standard varieties of the
wheat crackers which were otherwise identical. The likelihood that consumers notice whether a
product says “natural” (and therefore have the opportunity to pay a premium for the natural
variety) may depend on how obvious it is that the “natural” alternative exists.
18

Since different subjects saw the standard labels at different times (some saw the natural labels first and some
saw the standard labels first), we did not state this verbally. Instead, we included a piece of paper following the
main instructions for the Part that had information specific to the subject. Subjects were told to read this page
silently before bidding.
19
We expect that if the FDA does define the term “natural”, it will probably be defined similarly to phrases like
“low fat”; the label is not required, but if the manufacturer does use it, their product must meet certain conditions.
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2.4 Survey
The survey included questions regarding demographic information, general questions
about grocery shopping behavior, and questions eliciting knowledge and beliefs about “natural”
foods and foods containing GMOs. For instance, one important question read: “What do you
think the phrases ‘natural’ or ‘all natural’ actually mean when printed on a food label? (Please
check all that apply.)” with options such as “No artificial flavors”, “No artificial colors”, “No
pesticides”, “No dyes”, “Limited processing”, “Environmentally-friendly”, “No genetically
modified ingredients”, and “Organic”. Of course, in actuality, “natural” is not regulated and
therefore has no real meaning, but many participants checked at least a few options from our list
of 10 options. Other participants checked “None of the above” and still others wrote in things
like, “Only a few ingredients”.
Other questions asked participants to rate their agreement with various statements such as
“I am concerned that food products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) pose a
health risk”, “I am concerned that the production of products containing genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) poses an environmental risk”, and “Foods labelled ‘natural’ or ‘all natural’
are healthier than foods without a ‘natural’ or ‘all natural’ label.” For these questions, subjects
rated their agreement on a scale from 1 to 5.

2.5 Participants
In total, 164 non-student grocery shoppers living in the Knoxville, TN area participated
in the experiment. In an effort to match the demographics of U.S. grocery shoppers, we use a
disproportionate number of females and people who indicated that they shop on a regular basis
for multiple-person households. Katsaras et al. (2001) report that 76% of grocery shoppers are
women; our sample is 78% women. A survey by the Time Use Institute20 reported that the
average age of grocery shoppers is 47 and the median income is $50,525; the average age of our

20

The Time Use Institute: “Grocery Shopping: Who, Where and When” 2008. The data used is from The American
Time Use Survey, sponsored by the U.S. Dept. of Labor and fielded by the U.S. Census Bureau.
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sample is 46.8 and the median household income is within the range of $40,000-$60,000
(subjects only reported their household income range).
While many experiments use college students as participants, this demographic group is
not entirely appropriate for our purposes. As Huffman et al. (2003) point out, the share of
college-age grocery shoppers is below the share of college-age individuals in the population. We
pre-screened members of the Knoxville community based on demographics; the vast majority of
our participants are employed full-time. We paid our recruits $10 for showing up, $15 for
completing the survey, and additional money from the practice calculations and training rounds.
Subjects earned about $35 on average21 to come to the University of Tennessee to participate
(about 90% of subjects earned between $30 and $40). Each session lasted about 70 minutes.

III.

Results

3.1 Between-Subject Analysis Using Part 1 Bids
The experimental design allows for identification of labelling effects using multiple
comparisons22. First, we analyze only the Part 1 bids in order to achieve a clean, between-subject
comparison. Approximately half of our subjects bid on products with natural labels first and the
other half bid on products with standard labels first, allowing such a comparison. The results
(displayed in Table 3.3) indicate that there is a statistically significant overall impact of the
natural label for those who believed that “natural” means “no genetically modified organisms”.
We further break this down by product and see that the effect is significant for cereal, crackers
and oil, weakly significant for peanut butter, and insignificant for chips and toothpaste. The
willingness to pay for peanut butter could be affected by the fact that some “natural”-labelled
peanut butters have separation of oils, requiring them to be stirred; some subjects could be
21

The average earnings before the subjects had the opportunity to purchase grocery items was about $35.
Presumably, subjects only purchased goods at prices that were favorable to them, so the actual average benefit to
a participant was probably higher than $35.
22
Table 3.2 provides variable descriptions and means.

103

willing to pay more for varieties with additives, which keep the peanut butter spreadable. It is
also plausible that “natural” doesn’t have as strong an effect for non-edible items, such as
toothpaste. Further, it could be the case that when people purchase chips, their aim is not to be
healthy. Chips are generally snack foods and some buyers’ first priority with snacks could be
taste; the “natural” label may lead them to believe that these “healthier” versions are less tasty.
Table 3.4 displays several treatment effects of interest based on the model in Table 3.3.
We see that the “natural” premium for subjects who believe that “natural” means no GMOs is
significant for the “explicit” treatment, but not for the “implicit” treatment. This suggests that
when the lack of a “natural” label is specifically pointed out, subjects are willing to pay less for
the standard products. Thus, it was worthwhile to include both baselines in our design. While the
experimental setting is not necessarily representative of typical shopping experiences, this result
implies that when consumers are more readily confronted by the difference in labels (e.g. when
the two products sit adjacent to one another on the shelf), they are more likely to pay a premium
for the “natural” product. During our research, we noticed several products for which this is the
case: the “natural”-labelled and standard varieties of cooking oil, toothpaste, ice cream, mustard,
hamburger seasoning and chips are all located next to one another in the grocery store. For other
products, such as crackers, juice and cereal, shoppers have to visit either the “natural” foods
section or another store to find “natural” varieties. For the “explicit” treatment, the significant
premiums for subjects who believe “natural” means no GMOs range from $0.47 (chips) to $0.87
(cooking oil). The products had retail prices in the range of $2.00 to $5.00 so these premiums are
substantial23.
Interestingly, the “natural” label itself (for subjects who did not believe that “natural”
means no GMOs) actually had a negative premium for most products, though this is only
statistically significant for the “implied” treatment24. Again, we hypothesize that some subjects

23

The approximate retail prices are as follows (retail prices varied slightly from store to store depending on sales
and promotions): peanut butter, $3 - $4; crackers, $3 - $4; cereal, $4 - $4.75; cooking oil, $3 - $3.50; potato chips,
$2.50 - $3.50; toothpaste, $2.50 - $4.
24
The “explicit” treatment raised the premium enough that it is not significant, but it is still negative.
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may have believed that “natural” means “healthier” and that healthy products are less tasty25.
The last two rows in Table 3.4 provide the weighted effect for the “explicit” and “implicit”
treatments. Approximately 42% of our sample believed that “natural” means no GMOs; thus, the
no GMO effect is weighted by this percentage. These weighted effects are insignificant for most
products so we conclude that there is a null overall effect of the “natural” label. However, clearly
the subgroup who held the belief behaved quite differently. This could imply that manufacturers
may benefit from holding a portfolio of products to capture rents from different segments of the
market.
Although we do not report the results here, we also execute this model with additional
demographic and shopping behavior variables. However, these variables are not very
consequential and we justify removing them with statistical tests. The only statistically
significant factors are gender and the number of trips taken each week to purchase groceries.
Subjects who take one additional trip each week are, on average, willing to pay $0.13 more in the
“All Goods” model. Perhaps this is because these subjects are more familiar with the retail prices
of different types of products and are thus less uncertain about how much they are willing to pay.
We also explore the effects of other beliefs regarding “natural”, such as “no artificial content”
and vague claims such as “limited processing” or “environmentally-friendly”, but do not find
significant effects. Instead, it appears that “no genetically modified organisms” is the most
important factor contributing to the “natural” premium among our variables of interest26.

25

In fact, we do ask about “natural” and “healthy” in our survey. Some subjects did indicate that they believe
“foods labelled natural are healthier than foods without a natural label.” However, we cannot prove that subjects
believed healthier foods are less tasty; we simply observe a negative premium and suggest this as a possibility.
26
Responses to our Likert-scale survey questions are also explored as possible determinants of the “natural”
premium in a within-subject analysis. For instance, we include subjects’ Likert scale responses to questions like,
“Please rate your agreement with the following statement on a scale from 1 to 5. ‘I am concerned that the
production of products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) poses an environmental risk’”, where 5
represents “I completely agree”. However, the results are mostly insignificant. Further, the within-subject analysis
is possibly compromised due to framing effects biasing the Part 2 bids. Details are discussed later.
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3.2 Part 2 Bids and Framing Effects
Next, we turn to the Part 2 bids. Note that this analysis is not as clean as using Part 1
bids. When the subjects placed bids in Part 2, they were probably aware of our research question
– i.e. if they saw the standard labels first and natural labels second, or vice versa, they could infer
by Part 2 that we were testing their willingness to pay for the natural label. Indeed, we do find
quite a difference between Part 1 and Part 2. We replicated the model used in the Part 1 analysis
but restricted it to Part 2 bids. The associated treatment effects are displayed in Table 3.5.
Contrary to the Part 1 analysis, there is no longer preference heterogeneity conditional on beliefs
that “natural” means GMO-free. However, there is a significant positive effect of the natural
label itself. It is more pronounced in the “explicit” treatment, but is also statistically significant
in the “implied” treatment for cereal and toothpaste.
We hypothesize that framing or experimenter effects play a large role in Part 2. At this
point, subjects probably realized that the study was focused on the natural label. Further, subjects
may have felt that the experimenters were looking for a “natural” premium (e.g. “the labels have
changed between Part 1 and Part 2; the experimenters must be expecting me to behave
differently”). This framing or experimenter effect could have outweighed the effect of the
subjects’ own beliefs regarding the label; thus, the premium cannot be attributed to the “no
GMO” belief. This finding has important design implications for future work. Experiments and
surveys should be designed so that a clean, between-subject analysis can be extracted. While
within-subject calculations may be illustrative in some cases, researchers should exercise caution
when interpreting data.

3.3 Beliefs Regarding “Natural”
It is apparent from Table 3.2 that the majority of our subjects do believe that “natural”
has some meaning; in addition to the means for the specific beliefs, which range from 15% of the
sample to 70% of the sample, the average number of characteristics reported as beliefs was 4.24.
This is consistent with a recent article published in USA Today, which reports that “two-thirds of
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Americans think the word “natural” on the label of a packaged or processed food means it
contains no artificial ingredients, pesticides or genetically engineered organisms… under federal
labeling rules, the word natural means absolutely nothing27” (Weise 2014).
We examine beliefs a little further to determine how they differ based on demographics.
Not surprisingly, subjects who are more highly educated and subjects with young children report
knowing significantly more about GMOs. Older subjects are more likely to believe that GMOs
pose risks to human health or the environment; they are also more likely to believe foods labelled
“natural” are healthier than foods without a natural label. Higher income, a higher level of
educational attainment and being female all reduce the probability that subjects believe “natural”
labels indicate a vague claim such as “limited processing” or “environmentally-friendly”. From a
marketing standpoint, the heterogeneity in beliefs could mean that manufacturers might benefit
from holding portfolios of products containing both “natural” and standard versions. However,
demographics cannot predict the likelihood of believing “natural” means no GMOs, which is the
belief that actually leads to a premium.
We conclude that, on average, there is a null effect of the “natural” label. However, when
the sample is segregated based on the belief that “natural” means no GMOs, there is a positive
“natural” premium for those who hold the belief and a negative premium for those who do not
hold the belief. A policy to regulate phrases containing the word “natural” could possibly be
welfare-enhancing for both those who believe “natural” means GMO-free as well as those
without this belief for whom the phrase “natural” fosters negative associations.

IV. Conclusion

To our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the commonly used “natural” food
label, which is currently unregulated. We execute an experiment to examine consumer response

27

The article reports the results of a recently released survey by the magazine, Consumer Reports.
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to the label using a variety of grocery products. A hybrid approach is used to both elicit
willingness to pay (WTP) for foods with and without the label and elicit subjects’ knowledge and
beliefs surrounding the label and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). An incentivecompatible procedure is used to sell 12 products (6 product pairs). Each product pair consists of
a “natural”-labeled variety and a variety without a “natural” label. A survey is used to better
understand subjects’ beliefs regarding the meaning of the label and issues related to GMOs,
including health and environmental risks.
We find that the premium associated with the “natural” label is highly sensitive to the
belief of the buyer regarding GMO content. Buyers who believe that “natural” means “no
genetically modified organisms” are willing to pay a premium for a “natural” product, while
buyers without the belief instead have a negative premium. We break this down by product in
our between-subject analysis and find that the effect is significant for most products used in our
experiment. Further, we find that explicitly pointing out the lack of a “natural” label on standard
products decreases WTP relative to only plain labels. Finally, framing effects significantly
change the results for the Part 2 labels, which suggests that future work should not rely solely on
within-subject analysis.
Several pending lawsuits regarding GMOs in foods labeled as “natural” partially
motivate our paper. The “natural” label is not regulated in the U.S. Further, labelling of GMOs in
food products is not required in the U.S., even though it is required in almost every other
developed country. Thus, the pending lawsuits will set an important precedent. The results of this
study suggest that there is some merit to the plaintiffs’ complaints; many of our subjects believed
that the “natural” label has some meaning. Since the label is unregulated, “natural” could be a
misleading claim. However, only the “no GMO” belief for the “natural” label is actually
associated with a WTP premium. Forty-two percent of our sample held this belief, and, on
average for the sample, the effect is zero. Further, subjects arrived at our laboratory with
homegrown beliefs and we cannot necessarily rule out that there could be unobservable effects
correlated with the “no GMO” belief. It could be case that consumers who believe “natural”
means “no GMOs” are also those who exhibit a positive premium due to unobserved factors
correlated with this belief. We can say that there is a correlation between those who believe
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“natural” means “no GMOs” and those who are willing to pay a premium for a product labelled
as “natural”. Regulation of the “natural” label could help to resolve the information asymmetry.
If policymakers do decide to regulate the “natural” label, there are several directions in
which policy could move forward. One option is to define the “natural” label, requiring
manufacturers to meet certain conditions before using the label on their products. According to
our study, the conditions could include: no genetically modified material, no artificial flavors or
colorings, no pesticides and no dyes, as many of our subjects believed that this is what “natural”
indicates to them. Another option is to get rid of the “natural” label, banning it from food
products. The “organic” label is regulated and already conveys many of the characteristics that
consumers look for in the “natural” label. The final option, and possibly the most politically
feasible option, is to require disclosure of GMO content on food labels. Non-profit organizations,
such as the Center for Food Safety, have been advocating for GMO labelling for years.
Additionally, most other developed countries have GMO labelling laws. Although this option
would leave the “natural” label ambiguous, it would clarify the issue for consumers who may
currently believe that “natural” means “no genetically modified organisms”. Since we find a
premium for subjects with this belief, the policy would be welfare-enhancing.
Future work could include a wider range of products to determine whether these results
hold for different characteristics; for instance, shampoo or soap (many of which are labelled
“natural”) could be used. Additionally, one could compare the premiums associated with a “nonGMO” label (or an “organic” label) to the “natural” label by using these different labelling
schemes in a controlled experiment. Finally, as lawsuits involving “natural” and regulations
involving GMO labelling are currently evolving in the United States, one could take advantage
of future policy changes as natural experiments to determine whether and under what
circumstances consumers are willing to pay premiums for health and environmental-related
labels.
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Appendix A
Tables

Table 3.1: Session Schedule

Step 1

Introduction and read training instructions

Step 2

Allow subjects to answer practice calculations; moderators grade calculations as subjects
finish, and record earning on the Record Sheet

Step 3

Present answers to practice calculations to the group, discuss optimal bidding strategy, and
answer questions

Step 4

Step 5

Step 6

Training Round 1: Read instructions, allow subjects to place bids on the item ($7), determine
random prices by having volunteers roll dice (4 trials), and allow subjects to calculate their
earnings
Training Round 2: Read instructions, allow subjects to place bids on the item ($3), determine
random prices by having volunteers roll dice (4 trials), and allow subjects to calculate their
earnings
Training Round 3: Read instructions, allow subjects to choose to bid on the granola bar or the
candy bar (display both), allow subjects to place bids, determine a random price by having a
volunteer roll dice, allow subjects to record costs on Record Sheet if they made a purchase,
and give items to subjects who made purchases

Step 7

Main Experiment, Part 1: Read instructions, allow subjects to place bids

Step 8

Main Experiment, Part 2: Read instructions, allow subjects to place bids

Step 9

Determine one binding round from each Part by having a volunteer roll a 6-sided die,
determine random prices for each binding round by having a volunteer roll dice, and allow
subjects to record costs on Record Sheet if they made a purchase(s)

Step 10

Allow subjects to fill out survey

Step 11

Pay subjects and give them grocery products if they made a purchase(s)
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Table 3.2: Variable Definitions and Means
Variable Name

Definition

Mean

Age

= subject’s age

Female

= 1 if subject is female

0.78

Primary

= 1 if subject is the primary grocery shopper for the household

0.88

Trips

= number of trips subject takes to the grocery store each week

1.86

Natural

= 1 if bid was for a natural-labelled product; = 0 for standard product

Standard

= 1 if bid was for a standard product; = 0 for natural product
= 1 if subject was explicitly informed that the product was not
labelled natural
= 1 if the subject bid on the natural products first

Explicit
Natural First

46.75

Belief: No Art Flavor

0.70

Belief: No Art Color
Belief: No Art
Preservatives
Belief: No GMO

0.68

Belief: No Pesticides
Belief: No Dyes
Belief: Limited
Processing
Belief: Higher
Quality
Belief: EnvironmentFriendly
Belief: Organic
Total Beliefs
Healthy
GMO Know
GMO Health Risk
GMO Env Risk
GMO Concern
GMO Pay

0.68
0.42
= 1 if subject reported that he believed “natural” meant “no artificial
flavors”, “limited processing”, etc.; 0 otherwise

0.41
0.38
0.33
0.25
0.16
0.15

= total number of characteristics that the subject reported as his
beliefs regarding the “natural” label (min = 0, max = 10)
= the number subject indicated on a Likert scale from 1-5 to indicate
agreement with these statements: “Foods labelled natural are
healthier than foods without a natural label”, “I am concerned that
food products containing GMOs pose a health risk”, “I am
concerned that we as a society do not fully understand the impacts of
GMOs”, etc. Please see survey questions 22, 24, 25, 26 and 28 for
exact wording.
= 1 if subject indicated that he is willing to pay extra for food that
does not contain GMOs; 0 otherwise
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4.24
3.18
2.71
3.58
3.55
4.16
0.62

Table 3.3: Between-Subject Analysis Using Part 1 Bids
Dependent variable: Bid, in $
Variable

All
Goods

Peanut
Butter

Cereal

Crackers

Chips

Oil

Toothpaste

Natural ×
Belief: No GMO

0.54**
(0.19)

0.43*
(0.25)

0.80**
(0.25)

0.58**
(0.20)

0.29
(0.21)

0.89**
(0.27)

0.29
(0.21)

Natural

-0.43**
(0.19)

-0.01
(0.28)

-0.47*
(0.25)

-0.54**
(0.20)

-0.60**
(0.22)

-0.50*
(0.27)

-0.47**
(0.22)

Standard ×
Belief: No GMO

-0.18
(0.21)

0.08
(0.29)

-0.08
(0.28)

-0.18
(0.21)

-0.34
(0.24)

-0.26
(0.28)

-0.29
(0.22)

Standard × Explicit

-0.25
(0.21)

-0.02
(0.29)

-0.15
(0.27)

-0.33
(0.21)

-0.44*
(0.24)

-0.21
(0.27)

-0.36
(0.22)

Female

0.31**
(0.15)

0.22
(0.21)

0.12
(0.21)

0.31*
(0.16)

0.38**
(0.17)

0.62**
(0.22)

0.23
(0.17)

Trips per Week

0.13**
(0.06)

0.07
(0.07)

0.17**
(0.07)

0.09
(0.06)

0.17**
(0.06)

0.19**
(0.08)

0.11*
(0.06)

constant

1.70**
(0.23)

1.90**
(0.36)

1.91**
(0.28)

1.63**
(0.24)

1.52**
(0.25)

1.59**
(0.30)

1.61**
(0.24)

971
0.08

164
0.03

162
0.10

157
0.11

163
0.12

162
0.15

163
0.07

N
R2

Notes: * and ** denote coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10% and 5%
significance levels, respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.4: Treatment Effects Using Part 1 Data
Hypothesis

All
Goods

Peanut
Butter

Cereal

Crackers

Chips

Oil

Toothpaste

Natural No GMO =
Standard No GMO
(Explicit)

0.55**
(0.24)

0.36
(0.35)

0.57*
(0.32)

0.55**
(0.26)

0.47*
(0.28)

0.87**
(0.33)

0.47*
(0.26)

Natural No GMO =
Standard No GMO
(Implied)

0.29
(0.26)

0.34
(0.32)

0.42
(0.34)

0.21
(0.24)

0.03
(0.30)

0.65*
(0.36)

0.12
(0.27)

Natural w/o Belief =
Standard w/o Belief
(Explicit)

-0.17
(0.20)

0.01
(0.29)

-0.31
(0.28)

-0.21
(0.21)

-0.16
(0.22)

-0.29
(0.27)

-0.11
(0.24)

Natural w/o Belief =
Standard w/o Belief
(Implied)

-0.43**
(0.19)

-0.01
(0.28)

-0.47*
(0.25)

-0.54**
(0.20)

-0.60**
(0.22)

-0.50*
(0.27)

-0.47**
(0.22)

Natural Weighted =
Standard Weighted
(Explicit)

0.13
(0.16)

0.16
(0.25)

0.06
(0.23)

0.11
(0.18)

0.10
(0.19)

0.20
(0.22)

0.14
(0.19)

Natural Weighted =
Standard Weighted
(Implied)

-0.12
(0.17)

0.14
(0.23)

-0.09
(0.22)

-0.22
(0.17)

-0.34*
(0.20)

-0.01
(0.24)

-0.23
(0.19)

Notes: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Treatment Effects Using Part 2 Data
Hypothesis

All
Goods

Peanut
Butter

Cereal

Crackers

Chips

Oil

Toothpaste

Natural No GMO =
Standard No GMO
(Explicit)

0.24
(0.26)

0.50
(0.31)

0.32
(0.31)

0.38
(0.26)

0.37
(0.30)

-0.22
(0.43)

0.12
(0.24)

Natural No GMO =
Standard No GMO
(Implied)

-0.33
(0.26)

-0.16
(0.33)

-0.34
(0.34)

-0.30
(0.26)

-0.19
(0.31)

-0.71*
(0.37)

-0.27
(0.26)

Natural w/o Belief =
Standard w/o Belief
(Explicit)

0.94**
(0.22)

1.00**
(0.31)

1.21**
(0.28)

0.92**
(0.24)

0.89**
(0.22)

0.77**
(0.32)

0.88**
(0.23)

Natural w/o Belief =
Standard w/o Belief
(Implied)

0.37**
(0.18)

0.33
(0.26)

0.55**
(0.25)

0.24
(0.19)

0.32
(0.21)

0.28
(0.28)

0.49**
(0.21)

Natural Weighted =
Standard Weighted
(Explicit)

0.65**
(0.18)

0.79**
(0.24)

0.83**
(0.22)

0.69**
(0.19)

0.67**
(0.20)

0.36
(0.30)

0.56**
(0.18)

Natural Weighted =
Standard Weighted
(Implied)

0.07
(0.16)

0.12
(0.22)

0.17
(0.22)

0.01
(0.16)

0.10
(0.19)

-0.14
(0.24)

0.17
(0.18)

Notes: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Appendix B
Figures

Figure 3.1: Potato Chip Pictures and Labels
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Figure 3.2: Toothpaste Pictures and Labels
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Appendix C
Instructions
The training instructions and the Main Experiment Part 1 “explicit” instructions where the
standard products came first are presented here. Other versions of the instructions are available
upon request.

Introduction and Training
Welcome to the University of Tennessee Experimental Economics Laboratory. Your
participation in today’s study is appreciated. If you have a question at any time, please raise your
hand. Please refrain from verbally reacting to events that occur during the experiment. This is
very important. Your decisions in today’s study are private to you. We ask that you do not
communicate with other study participants. We also ask that, after the session, you do not discuss
details with others who have registered to potentially participate in a future session of this study.
The decisions you make (including your answers to survey questions) will be linked only with
your station ID, which was (randomly) chosen by you when you entered the lab. Your decisions
will not be associated with your name or other identifying information. Your name will not be
linked in any way to the results of the study. For accounting purposes, we will ask you to fill out
a receipt at the end of the session. We do not keep the receipts; they are submitted to the UT
Treasurer’s office.
In the main parts of the experiment, you will be asked to place bids to buy common grocery
items. Although you will not earn money in these parts, you will have the opportunity to actually
buy some of these items and take them home with you today. The purchase procedure will be
new to you. We will first go through a series of training materials that will familiarize you with
the purchase procedure. The good news is that you will have the opportunity to earn cash money
during this training.
You will be paid in cash and in private at the end of the session. You will receive a show-up fee
of $10 for participating, an additional $15 for completing a survey, and additional money from
the training rounds. If you purchase one or more grocery items, the amount you pay for the
product(s) will be subtracted from your earnings. We will proceed through the written
materials together. Please do not flip forward until instructed.
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General Procedures
In each decision “round” of this study, the moderator will offer an item for sale. In the initial
training rounds, the item for sale will be an amount of money. In the other rounds, the item for
sale will be a grocery product. In each round you place a bid to buy the item for sale.
We will use the following purchase procedure in all rounds:
1. You will place a bid on the item. You will not know the price prior to bidding.
2. The price of the item will be randomly drawn. A volunteer will be asked to roll dice to
determine this price. The random price will be the same for all participants.
3. If your bid is equal to or higher than the random price, you buy the item and pay
the random price (not your bid!). If your bid is lower than the random price, you do
not buy the item.
Here are some possible scenarios based on the purchase procedure:
 You bid $2. The random price is drawn to be $1.50. Since your bid is equal to or higher
than the random price, you buy the item at a price of $1.50.
 You bid $5. The random price is drawn to be $5. Since your bid is equal to or higher than
the random price, you buy the item at a price of $5.
 You bid $3. The random price is drawn to be $3.50. Since your bid is lower than the
random price, you do not buy the item.
It is important to point out some aspects of the procedure. First, different from auctions, you are
not bidding against other players. The bids of other players do not impact whether you buy an
item. We have large quantities of each item. If, for example, everyone bids an amount higher
than the random price, each person will pay the random price and each person will receive the
item. Second, different from some auctions, if you buy something, the price is not equal to your
bid. Instead, you pay the randomly selected price.
Third, your bid sets the highest price for which you agree to buy the good. For example, if
you bid $6.25, this means that you agree to buy the item as long as the price is something less
than or equal to $6.25. Your bid of $6.25 guarantees that you do not buy the item at prices above
$6.25.
Before bidding you should ask yourself “what is the highest price I am willing to pay for
the item?” It is in your best interest to place a bid equal to this highest price.
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“What If” Scenarios
To help you understand the procedures, we ask that you consider a number of “what if”
scenarios. Here is the good news: you will be paid $1 for each scenario you answer correctly.
There is a bonus question, and you will be paid $2 for a correct answer to this.
The item for sale in these scenarios is a $5 bill. Remember: If your bid is equal to or higher
than the random price, you buy the item and pay the random price (not your bid!). If your bid is
lower than the random price, you do not buy.
1. Suppose you bid $2.50. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $4.00.
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?
Yes No
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?
$ _____________
2. Suppose you bid $3.12. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $6.37.
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?
Yes No
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?
$ _____________
3. Suppose you bid $5.00. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $4.25.
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?
Yes No
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?
$ _____________
4. Suppose you bid $5.00. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $6.56.
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?
Yes No
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?
$ _____________
5. Suppose you bid $7.16. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $4.12.
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?
Yes No
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?
$ _____________
6. Suppose you bid $8.00. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $6.50.
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?
Yes No
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?
$ _____________
Bonus question. Given the purchase procedure, how much should you bid for the $5 bill? Keep
in mind that it is in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest price you’re willing to
pay.
You should bid: $ _________ . _________
Please raise your hand when you are ready to have your calculations checked.
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Training Round 1
In this training round you will have the opportunity to earn money.
The item for sale is $7.
Your task in this round is to place a bid to buy the $7.
After everyone has indicated their bid, a volunteer will roll dice to determine the random price.
Although you will not know the price range before you bid, know that three dice will be rolled.
The first will determine the dollars and the other two will determine the cents.
If your bid is equal to or higher than the random price, you will receive the $7 and pay the
random price. You will thus earn an amount equal to: $7 minus the random price. If you make a
purchase at a price that is higher than $7, you will in fact have negative earnings (lose money).
If your bid is less than the random price, you will not receive the $7. You will not pay the
random price. You will earn $0.
For training purposes, we will play out the purchase procedure (rolling the dice and calculating
earnings) several times. However, you will only bid once. You will not be able to change your
bid after the random prices are determined.
Please determine your bid at this time and write it here: $ _________ . _________

Trial 1
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (check the box below)
 Yes. You bought the $7.
Your earnings are equal to: $7 – ________________ = $ _________ . _________
(random price)
 No. You did not buy the $7. Your earning are for this trial are $0.
Record your earnings on your Record Sheet.
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Training Round 1—Continued
Trial 2
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (check the box below)
 Yes. You bought the $7.
Your earnings are equal to: $7 – ________________ = $ _________ . _________
(random price)
 No. You did not buy the $7. Your earning are for this trial are $0.
Record your earnings on your Record Sheet.

Trial 3
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (check the box below)
 Yes. You bought the $7.
Your earnings are equal to: $7 – ________________ = $ _________ . _________
(random price)
 No. You did not buy the $7. Your earning are for this trial are $0.
Record your earnings on your Record Sheet.

Trial 4
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (check the box below)
 Yes. You bought the $7.
Your earnings are equal to: $7 – ________________ = $ _________ . _________
(random price)
 No. You did not buy the $7. Your earning are for this trial are $0.
Record your earnings on your Record Sheet.
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Training Round 2
The item for sale is $3. Your task in this round is to place a bid to buy the $3.
After everyone has indicated their bid, a volunteer will roll dice to determine the random price.
Although you will not know the price range before you bid, know that three dice will be rolled.
The first will determine the dollars and the other two will determine the cents.
If your bid is equal to or higher than the random price, you will receive the $3 and pay the
random price. You will thus earn an amount equal to: $3 minus the random price. If you make a
purchase at a price that is higher than $3, you will in fact have negative earnings (lose money). If
your bid is less than the random price, you will not receive the $3. You will not pay the random
price. You will earn $0.
Please determine your bid at this time and write it here: $ _________ . _________
Trial 1
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (check the box below)
 Yes. You bought the $3. Your earnings are: $3 – random price = $ ________ . ________
 No. You did not buy the $3. Your earning are for this trial are $0.
Trial 2
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (check the box below)
 Yes. You bought the $3. Your earnings are: $3 – random price = $ ________ . ________
 No. You did not buy the $3. Your earning are for this trial are $0.
Trial 3
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (check the box below)
 Yes. You bought the $3. Your earnings are: $3 – random price = $ ________ . ________
 No. You did not buy the $3. Your earning are for this trial are $0.
Trial 4
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (check the box below)
 Yes. You bought the $3. Your earnings are: $3 – random price = $ ________ . ________
 No. You did not buy the $3. Your earning are for this trial are $0.
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Training Round 3
You will not have the ability to earn money in this round. Instead, you will have the opportunity
to buy a real grocery product. If you buy something, you will pay for it out of your earnings.
As before, if your bid is equal to or higher than the random price, you will buy the item and pay
the random price. Otherwise, you will not buy the item.
The previous training rounds emphasize that it is in your best interest to place a bid equal to the
highest price you are willing to pay for the item. By doing so, you will only purchase the item at
prices you are willing to pay. You will not purchase the item at prices you are not willing to pay.
If you instead bid lower than this highest price you are willing to pay, you risk not purchasing
the item at prices favorable to you.
If you instead bid more than this highest price you are willing to pay, you risk purchasing the
item at prices that are not favorable to you.
The moderator will now show you two items to choose from: a candy bar and a granola bar.
Please choose which item you would like to bid on and check the appropriate box below:




Candy Bar

Granola Bar

The random price will be an amount between $0.00 and the maximum expected bid (based on
previous research). A volunteer will roll dice to determine the price, and each price within the
range will be equally likely.
Please determine your bid at this time. You will not be able to change your bid after the
random price is determined.
Your bid: $_________ . _________

Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (check the box below)
 Yes. You will receive the item you bid on. The price will be subtracted from your
earnings as a cost.
 No. You did not buy anything. No money will be subtracted from your earnings.
Record your cost for this round on your Record Sheet.
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Main Experiment – Part 1
As in the last training round, you will not have the ability to earn money in the following
decision rounds. Instead, you will have the opportunity to buy real grocery products. If you buy
something, you will pay for it out of your earnings.
In this Part of the experiment, you will place bids for a variety of grocery items. You will not see
the actual items, but you will be provided with an information label that describes the main
characteristics of the item such as the type of item, and its size, flavor, etc. The information on
the labels is accurate: the actual label on the real grocery item does reflect the information that
you see in information label. In this Part, you will be asked to place bids for 6 different grocery
items.
We have all of the grocery items in the lab today. All of the items have been recently purchased
from popular grocery stores in Knoxville.
The procedure for purchasing items is the same as before. Your bid will be compared to a
random price. You will purchase the good only if your bid is equal to or higher than the price.
The random price will be a randomly drawn number between $0.00 and the maximum expected
bid (based on previous research). A volunteer will role dice to determine the price, and each
price within the range will be equally likely. The range of prices will not be the same as in the
last training round.
As before, it is in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest price you are willing to pay
for the item. By doing so, you will only purchase the item at prices you are willing to pay. You
will not purchase the item at prices you are not willing to pay.
If you instead bid lower than the highest price you are willing to pay, you risk not purchasing the
item at prices favorable to you. If you instead bid more than this highest price you are willing to
pay, you risk purchasing the item at prices that are not favorable to you.
Only one round from this Part will be implemented for real. We will have a volunteer roll a sixsided die to determine which round this is. Since you will not know which round will be selected
prior to making any decisions, it is in your best interest to take each decision seriously as if it
will determine an actual purchase.
On the next page you will see important information that is specific to you. Please read this
information, and then proceed to place your bids. You have six minutes to do so.
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Please Read:
The grocery items in this section are not advertised as “Natural”, “All Natural”, or “100%
Natural” on their labels.
Please proceed to the labels now.
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Part 1, Round 1

Please read the label carefully before determining your bid. Since the purchase procedure is the
same as before, remember that it will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest
price you are willing to pay for the item.
Your bid (in dollars): $_________ . _________
The volunteer will now determine the random price. Please write the random price here:
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (Circle one.)

Yes

No

If “Yes”, you bought the item (and will receive it at the end of the session)
Your cost is the random price, which is: $ _________ . _________
If “No”, you did not buy the item. Your cost is $0.00.
On your record sheet, please indicate whether you made a purchase. If so, please record the cost
of the item as well as indicate what you bought. Otherwise, simply record a cost of $0.
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Part 1, Round 2

Please read the label carefully before determining your bid. Since the purchase procedure is the
same as before, remember that it will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest
price you are willing to pay for the item.
Your bid (in dollars): $_________ . _________
The volunteer will now determine the random price. Please write the random price here:
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (Circle one.)

Yes

No

If “Yes”, you bought the item (and will receive it at the end of the session)
Your cost is the random price, which is: $ _________ . _________
If “No”, you did not buy the item. Your cost is $0.00.
On your record sheet, please indicate whether you made a purchase. If so, please record the cost
of the item as well as indicate what you bought. Otherwise, simply record a cost of $0.
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Part 1, Round 3

Please read the label carefully before determining your bid. Since the purchase procedure is the
same as before, remember that it will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest
price you are willing to pay for the item.
Your bid (in dollars): $_________ . _________
The volunteer will now determine the random price. Please write the random price here:
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (Circle one.)

Yes

No

If “Yes”, you bought the item (and will receive it at the end of the session)
Your cost is the random price, which is: $ _________ . _________
If “No”, you did not buy the item. Your cost is $0.00.
On your record sheet, please indicate whether you made a purchase. If so, please record the cost
of the item as well as indicate what you bought. Otherwise, simply record a cost of $0.
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Part 1, Round 4

Please read the label carefully before determining your bid. Since the purchase procedure is the
same as before, remember that it will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest
price you are willing to pay for the item.
Your bid (in dollars): $_________ . _________
The volunteer will now determine the random price. Please write the random price here:
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (Circle one.)

Yes

No

If “Yes”, you bought the item (and will receive it at the end of the session)
Your cost is the random price, which is: $ _________ . _________
If “No”, you did not buy the item. Your cost is $0.00.
On your record sheet, please indicate whether you made a purchase. If so, please record the cost
of the item as well as indicate what you bought. Otherwise, simply record a cost of $0.
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Part 1, Round 5

Please read the label carefully before determining your bid. Since the purchase procedure is the
same as before, remember that it will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest
price you are willing to pay for the item.
Your bid (in dollars): $_________ . _________
The volunteer will now determine the random price. Please write the random price here:
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (Circle one.)

Yes

No

If “Yes”, you bought the item (and will receive it at the end of the session)
Your cost is the random price, which is: $ _________ . _________
If “No”, you did not buy the item. Your cost is $0.00.
On your record sheet, please indicate whether you made a purchase. If so, please record the cost
of the item as well as indicate what you bought. Otherwise, simply record a cost of $0.
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Part 1, Round 6

Please read the label carefully before determining your bid. Since the purchase procedure is the
same as before, remember that it will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest
price you are willing to pay for the item.
Your bid (in dollars): $_________ . _________
The volunteer will now determine the random price. Please write the random price here:
Random price: $_________ . _________
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price? (Circle one.)

Yes

No

If “Yes”, you bought the item (and will receive it at the end of the session)
Your cost is the random price, which is: $ _________ . _________
If “No”, you did not buy the item. Your cost is $0.00.
On your record sheet, please indicate whether you made a purchase. If so, please record the cost
of the item as well as indicate what you bought. Otherwise, simply record a cost of $0.
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Appendix D
Survey
Please answer the following questions. Please write/check clearly. Your responses will not be
connected to your name or other identifying information.
1. What is your age? ________
2. What is your gender? (Please check one.)
 Male
 Female
3. What is the highest level of education you have attained? (Please check one.)
 High School Diploma
 Associate’s Degree
 Bachelor’s Degree
 Master’s Degree
 Ph.D. Degree
 Other Advanced Certification/Professional Studies
4. Were you a student during the 2013-2014 academic year? (Please check one.)
 Yes, full-time
 Yes, part-time
 No
5. Which of the following best describes your current employment status? (Please check
one.)
 Employed, full-time
 Employed, part-time
 Self-employed
 Unemployed or retired
6. What is your marital status? (Please check one.)
 Single
 Married
 Widowed
 Divorced
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7. Are you the primary grocery shopper in your household? (Please check one.)
 Yes
 No
8. In 2013, what was your annual household income, before taxes? (Please check one.)
 $5,000 or less
 $5,000 - $10,000
 $10,001 - $20,000
 $20,001 - $40,000
 $40,001 - $60,000
 $60,001 - $80,000
 $80,001 - $100,000
 $100,001 - $120,000
 $120,001 - $140,000
 More than $140,000
9. How many adults live in your household? _______
10. How many children live in your household? ________
11. Do you have any children living in your household under the age of 10? (Please check
one.)
 Yes
 No
12. How much does your household typically spend each week on groceries? (Please check
one.)
 $30 or less
 $31 - $50
 $51 - $100
 $101 - $150
 $151 - $200
 $201 - $250
 $251 - $300
 $301 - $350
 More than $350
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13. How many trips do you typically take to buy groceries each week? (Please check one.)
 Less than 1
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 More than 5
14. Where have you shopped for groceries during the last month? (Please check all that
apply.)
 Kroger
 Food City
 Ingles
 Publix
 Earth Fare
 Fresh Market
 Target
 Walmart
 Sam’s Club
 Costco
 CVS / Walgreens / other convenience store
 Local farmer’s markets
 Amazon or other online grocery retailer
 Other: ________________________________________________
15. How many meals do you typically eat out (at a restaurant or fast food establishment) per
week? (Please check one.)
 0
 1-5
 6-10
 11-15
 More than 15
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16. When grocery shopping, do you specifically look for products that meet certain dietary
restrictions? (If yes, please check all that apply. If no, please leave blank.)
 Gluten-free
 Lactose-free
 Vegetarian
 Vegan
 Low carb
 Low fat
 No nuts
 No soy
 No fish
 Other: ________________________________________________
17. How important are each of the following to you when you purchase food? (Please check
one box per row.)
Not
Important

Somewhat
Important

Very
Important

Nutrition Information
Ingredients
Country where food was
produced
Brand
Package size
Price
Health-related labelling such as
“gluten-free”
Environmental-related labelling
such as “Rainforest Alliance
Certified”
Other:
18. When grocery shopping, how often do you notice labels that say “natural” or “all
natural”? (Please check one.)
 Almost always or always
 Frequently
 Occasionally
 Almost never or never
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19. When grocery shopping and when such an option is available, how often do you purchase
foods that are labelled “natural” or “all natural”? (Please check one.)
 Almost always or always
 Frequently
 Occasionally
 Almost never or never
20. What do you think the phrases “natural” or “all natural” actually mean when printed
on a food label? (Please check all that apply.)
 No artificial flavors
 No artificial colors
 No artificial preservatives
 No genetically modified ingredients
 No pesticides
 No dyes
 Limited processing
 Higher quality ingredients
 Environmentally-friendly
 Organic
 Other: _______________________________________________
 None of these
21. What do you think the phrases “natural” or “all natural” should mean when printed on
a food label? (Please check all that apply.)
 No artificial flavors
 No artificial colors
 No artificial preservatives
 No genetically modified ingredients
 No pesticides
 No dyes
 Limited processing
 Higher quality ingredients
 Environmentally-friendly
 Organic
 Other: _______________________________________________
 None of these
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22. Please rate your agreement with the following statement on a scale from 1 to 5. (Circle
one number.)
“Foods labelled “natural” or “all natural” are healthier than foods without a “natural”
or “all natural” label.”
I completely
disagree
1

I completely
agree
2

3

4

5

23. When you see a food label that says “organic”, do you trust that the product is truly
organic? Please rate your level of trust on a scale from 1 to 5. (Circle one number.)
I do not trust
the label at all
1

I completely
trust the label
2

3

4

5

24. Please rate your knowledge of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) on a scale from
1 to 5. (Circle one number.) If you had never heard of GMOs prior to this question,
please circle “1”.
I know
nothing about
GMOs
1

I know a lot
about GMOs

2

3
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4

5

25. Please rate your agreement with the following statement on a scale from 1 to 5. (Circle
one number.)
“I am concerned that food products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
pose a health risk.”
I completely
disagree
1

I completely
agree
2

3

4

5

26. Please rate your agreement with the following statement on a scale from 1 to 5. (Circle
one number.)
“I am concerned that the production of products containing genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) poses an environmental risk.”
I completely
disagree
1

I completely
agree
2

3

4

5

27. When you see a food label that says “Non-GMO” or “Non-GMO Project Verified”, do
you trust that the product is free of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)? Please
rate your level of trust on a scale from 1 to 5. (Circle one number.)
I do not trust
the label at all
1

I completely
trust the label
2

3
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5

28. Please rate your agreement with the following statement on a scale from 1 to 5. (Circle
one number.)
“I am concerned that we as a society do not fully understand the impacts of genetically
modified organisms (GMOs).”
I completely
disagree
1

I completely
agree
2

3

4

5

29. Are you willing to pay extra for a food item that does not contain genetically modified
organisms (GMOs)? (Please check one.)
 Yes
 No
30. Did you feel that you were well-compensated for your participation in this experiment?
Please rate your satisfaction with the compensation on a scale from 1 to 5. (Circle one
number.)
I was
compensated
very poorly
1

I was
compensated
very well
2

3

4

5

31. Did you understand the instructions for the experiment today? Please rate your
understanding on a scale from 1 to 5. (Circle one number.)
I understood
very poorly
1

I understood
very well
2

3
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5

CONCLUSION
This dissertation entitled, “Essays in Resource Allocation Efficiency and Behavior,” is
comprised of three papers. The first examines bidder’s choice auctions using a field experiment
and a laboratory experiment. Auctions are frequently used to allocate resources efficiently.
However, we show that the bidder’s choice mechanism, which is sensitive to the effects of risk
aversion, does not command as high of a premium as previously predicted by the literature under
certain circumstances. Thus, sellers should evaluate their bidders and situation to determine
whether the bidder’s choice format is likely to be helpful.
In the second chapter, theoretical modelling is used to show that managers in public
organizations can use task incentives to motivate agents when pecuniary methods are
unavailable. Managers in schools and government agencies are frequently faced with this
constraint. Tournaments have long been used to model competition in the labor market. This
paper illustrates how agents can be motivated to put forth optimal effort in a distinct setting
characterized by task assignment, though inefficiency is created.
Finally, inefficiency in the market for “natural” food is highlighted in Chapter 3.
Although the phrase “natural” is unregulated in the United States, most consumers do believe
that the label indicates at least one characteristic such as “no artificial colors” or “no genetically
modified ingredients”. This study is comprised of both a survey where beliefs are elicited and an
incentive-compatible purchase procedure where consumers are motivated to reveal their
willingness to pay for food items with “natural” and standard labels. The results indicate that a
policy which regulated or defined the “natural” phrase would be welfare-enhancing.
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